IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v38y1995i2p251-64.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis

Author

Listed:
  • Peterson, Steven
  • Hoffer, George
  • Millner, Edward

Abstract

An increasing number of researchers have hypothesized that regulatory attempts to improve automotive safety through product design would be at least partially offset by driver behavioral changes. This article analyzes two independent data sets to test whether differences in driver behavior exist between cars equipped with air bags and those not so equipped. An analysis of an insurance industry generated data set reveals that relative injury claims increase following adoption of an air bag system. Since there is no indication that the increase diminishes over time, the results appear to be attributable to offsetting behavior as opposed to a sorting of auto buyers. Analyses of 1993 Virginia State Police accident reports indicate that air-bag-equipped cars tend to be driven more aggressively and that aggressiveness appears to offset the effect of the air bag for the driver and increases the risk of death to others. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Peterson, Steven & Hoffer, George & Millner, Edward, 1995. "Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 251-264, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:2:p:251-64
    DOI: 10.1086/467331
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467331
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/467331?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert S. Chirinko & Edward P. Harper, 1993. "Buckle up or slow down? New estimates of offsetting behavior and their implications for automobile safety regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 270-296.
    2. Crandall, Robert W & Keeler, Theodore E & Lave, Lester B, 1982. "The Cost of Automobile Safety and Emissions Regulation to the Consumer: Some Preliminary Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 324-327, May.
    3. Winston, Clifford & Mannering, Fred, 1984. "Consumer Demand for Automobile Safety," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 316-319, May.
    4. Keeler, Theodore E, 1994. "Highway Safety, Economic Behavior, and Driving Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 684-693, June.
    5. John D. Graham & Steven Garber, 1984. "Evaluating the effects of automobile safety regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 3(2), pages 206-224.
    6. Crandall, Robert W & Graham, John D, 1989. "The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 97-118, April.
    7. Crandall, Robert W & Graham, John D, 1984. "Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 328-331, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Russell S. Sobel & Todd M. Nesbit, 2007. "Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 71-84, July.
    2. Potter Joel M, 2011. "Estimating the Offsetting Effects of Driver Behavior in Response to Safety Regulation: The Case of Formula One Racing," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 1-22, July.
    3. McCarthy, Patrick S, 1995. "The 1982 Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA): Implications of relaxed truck weight and size limits for highway safety," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 107-117, April.
    4. Clifford Winston & Vikram Maheshri & Fred Mannering, 2006. "An exploration of the offset hypothesis using disaggregate data: The case of airbags and antilock brakes," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 83-99, March.
    5. Berlemann, Michael & Matthes, Andreas, 2014. "Positive externalities from active car safety systems," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 313-329.
    6. Bae, Yong-Kyun, 2011. "Primary Seat Belt Laws and Offsetting Behavior: Empirical Evidence from Individual Accident Data," MPRA Paper 30443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. J. Brian O'Roark & William C. Wood, 2004. "Safety at the Racetrack: Results of Restrictor Plates in Superspeedway Competition," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(1), pages 118-129, July.
    8. Marc Poitras & Daniel Sutter, 2002. "Policy Ineffectiveness or Offsetting Behavior? An Analysis of Vehicle Safety Inspections," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(4), pages 922-934, April.
    9. Bae, Yong-Kyun, 2013. "Primary Seat-Belt Laws and Driver Behavior: Evidence from Accident Data," MPRA Paper 49823, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Sep 2013.
    10. McCarthy, Patrick & Talley, Wayne K., 1999. "Evidence on risk compensation and safety behaviour," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 91-96, January.
    11. Daron Acemoglu & Ali Makhdoumi & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2020. "Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing and the Spread of an Infection," NBER Working Papers 27483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Hahn Robert, 2010. "Designing Smarter Regulation with Improved Benefit-Cost Analysis," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-19, July.
    13. Germà Bel & Óscar Gasulla & Ferran A. Mazaira-Font, 2020. "The effect of health and economic costs on governments' policy responses to COVID-19 crisis, under incomplete information," IREA Working Papers 202008, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jun 2020.
    14. Michael Grimm & Carole Treibich, 2013. "Why Do Some Bikers Wear a Helmet and Others Don't? Evidence from Delhi, India," AMSE Working Papers 1348, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 10 Oct 2013.
    15. Talley, Wayne K., 1999. "Determinants of injuries in barge accidents," Transportation Research Forum Proceedings 1990s 312001, Transportation Research Forum.
    16. Robert S. Chirinko & Edward P. Harper, 1993. "Buckle up or slow down? New estimates of offsetting behavior and their implications for automobile safety regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 270-296.
    17. Alberto Chong & Pascal Restrepo, 2011. "Peltzman on Ice: Evidence on Compensating Behavior Using a Natural Experiment from Ice Hockey," Working Papers 2011-12, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    18. White, Michelle J, 2004. "The "Arms Race" on American Roads: The Effect of Sport Utility Vehicles and Pickup Trucks on Traffic Safety," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 333-355, October.
    19. Liang, Yuanning, 2023. "Do Safety Inspections Improve Safety? Evidence from the Roadside Inspection Program for Commercial Vehicles," 2023 Annual Meeting, July 23-25, Washington D.C. 335618, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    20. Stavins, Robert, 2005. "The Effects of Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation," Working Paper Series rwp05-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:2:p:251-64. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.