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Estimating the Offsetting Effects of Driver Behavior in Response to Safety Regulation: The Case of Formula One Racing

Listed author(s):
  • Potter Joel M

    (North Georgia College & State University)

Registered author(s):

    Using a unique dataset, this paper empirically tests the Peltzman effect by investigating the behavior of Formula One racecar drivers. Estimates suggest that drivers become more reckless as their cars become safer, ceteris paribus. From 1963-1973, safety changes, on average, are estimated to leave the number of driver casualties unchanged. Furthermore, this is the first attempt to estimate specifically how drivers respond to changes in the conditional probability of fatality given an accident. Results provide evidence that the behavioral response of drivers is larger when the analysis is confined to changes in the conditional probability of a fatality given an accident.

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    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jqas.2011.7.3/jqas.2011.7.3.1276/jqas.2011.7.3.1276.xml?format=INT
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    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports.

    Volume (Year): 7 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 3 (July)
    Pages: 1-22

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    Handle: RePEc:bpj:jqsprt:v:7:y:2011:i:3:n:1
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    1. Robert S. Chirinko & Edward P. Harper, 1993. "Buckle up or slow down? New estimates of offsetting behavior and their implications for automobile safety regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 270-296.
    2. J. Brian O'Roark & William C. Wood, 2004. "Safety at the Racetrack: Results of Restrictor Plates in Superspeedway Competition," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 118-129, July.
    3. John D. Graham & Steven Garber, 1984. "Evaluating the effects of automobile safety regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 3(2), pages 206-224.
    4. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
    5. Peterson, Steven P & Hoffer, George E, 1994. " The Impact of Airbag Adoption on Relative Personal Injury and Absolute Collision Insurance Claims," Journal of Consumer Research, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 657-662, March.
    6. Russell S. Sobel & Todd M. Nesbit, 2007. "Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 71-84, July.
    7. Peterson, Steven & Hoffer, George & Millner, Edward, 1995. "Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 251-264, October.
    8. Graves, Philip E. & Lee, Dwight R. & Sexton, Robert L., 1993. "Speed variance, enforcement, and the optimal speed limit," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 237-243.
    9. Evans, William N & Graham, John D, 1991. "Risk Reduction or Risk Compensation? The Case of Mandatory Safety-Belt Use Laws," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 61-73, January.
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