Testing for Offsetting Behavior and Adverse Recruitment Among Drivers of Airbag-Equipped Vehicles
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- Berlemann, Michael & Matthes, Andreas, 2014. "Positive externalities from active car safety systems," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 313-329.
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"The value of technology improvements in games with externalities: A fresh look at offsetting behavior,"
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- Michael Hoy & Mattias Polborn, 2014. "The Value of Technology Improvements in Games with Externalities: A Fresh Look at Offsetting Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 4798, CESifo Group Munich.
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