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Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance: Empirical Evidence from a Large Administrative Sample

Author

Listed:
  • Mette Ejrnæs

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Stefan Hochguertel

    (AKF, Danish Institute of Governmental Research)

Abstract

We study risk behavior of Danish self-employed entrepreneurs, whose income risk may be driven by both exogenous factors and effort choice (moral hazard). Partial insurance is available through voluntary unemployment insurance (UI). Additional incentives to sign insurance contracts stem from a UI-embedded, government-subsidized early retirement (ER) program, giving benefits that are unrelated to business risk. Indeed, we argue that the self-employeds’ incentives to insure themselves stem from the ER plan rather than from the UI cover. We show how to use a policy reform to identify moral hazard in observed transitions to unemployment when insurance is a choice variable. We use administrative (register) panel data covering 10% of the Danish population. We find that the insured are indeed more likely to transit into unemployment than the uninsured, once we properly instrument for the insurance choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Mette Ejrnæs & Stefan Hochguertel, 2008. "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance: Empirical Evidence from a Large Administrative Sample," CAM Working Papers 2008-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieca:2008_02
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cam/wp0910/wp0708/2008-02.pdf/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. José María Millán & Emilio Congregado & Concepción Román, 2010. "Determinants of Self-Employment Dynamics and their Implications on Entrepreneurial Policy Effectiveness," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, pages 45-76.
    2. Román, Concepción & Congregado, Emilio & Millán, José María, 2013. "Start-up incentives: Entrepreneurship policy or active labour market programme?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 151-175.
    3. José Millán & Emilio Congregado & Concepción Román, 2012. "Determinants of self-employment survival in Europe," Small Business Economics, Springer, pages 231-258.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    entrepreneurs; self-employment; early retirement; unemployment insurance; moral hazard; Denmark; panel data;

    JEL classification:

    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies

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