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Voluntary Public Unemployment Insurance

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  • Donald O. Parsons
  • Torben Tranaes
  • Helene Bie Lilleør

Abstract

Denmark has drawn much attention for its active labor market policies, but is almost unique in offering a voluntary public unemployment insurance program requiring a significant premium payment. A safety net program--a less generous, means-tested social assistance plan—completes the system. The voluntary system emerged as one of many European “Ghent systems,” essentially government subsidized trade union plans, but has since lost many key features of such plans. We assess system performance using a 10% sample of the Danish population drawn from administrative data. Coverage rates for the voluntary programs are surprisingly high, approximately 80 percent of the workforce, but the program has predictable selection effects, including adverse selection across risk classes and a substantial charity hazard (low coverage among those with generous treatment under the safety net program). The latter appears to explain the difficulty of shifting to a compulsory system; redistribution effects would be concentrated among the previously uninsured in the lowest decile of the income distribution, a problem in the Danish welfare state.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald O. Parsons & Torben Tranaes & Helene Bie Lilleør, 2015. "Voluntary Public Unemployment Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 5181, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5181
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    1. Bartha, Zoltán & Sáfrányné Gubik, Andrea & Tóthné Szita, Klára, 2013. "Intézményi megoldások, fejlődési modellek [Institutional solutions, development models]," MPRA Paper 50901, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Donald O. Parsons & Torben Tranæs & Helene Bie Lilleør, 1999. "Voluntary Public Unemployment Insurance," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Jun 2003.
    3. Mengus , Eric & Pancrazi , Roberto, 2015. "The Inequality Accelerator," HEC Research Papers Series 1108, HEC Paris.
    4. Jespersen, Svend T. & Munch, Jakob R. & Skipper, Lars, 2008. "Costs and benefits of Danish active labour market programmes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 859-884, October.
    5. Marta Aloi & Teresa Lloyd-Braga & Manuel Leite-Monteiro, 2017. "Welfare benefit reforms and employment," Discussion Papers 2017/02, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
    6. Nathaniel Hendren & Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 457-486, August.
    7. Torben Andersen, 2003. "From Excess to Shortage - Recent Developments in the Danish Labour Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 933, CESifo.
    8. Torben M. Andersen & Michael Svarer, 2007. "Flexicurity: Labour Market Performance in Denmark," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 53(3), pages 389-429, September.
    9. Maczulskij, Terhi & Haapanen, Mika & Kauhanen, Antti & Riukula, Krista, 2021. "Dark Half: Decentralized Bargaining and Well-being at Work," ETLA Working Papers 89, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    10. Moller Dano, Anne & Ejrnaes, Mette & Husted, Leif, 2005. "Do single women value early retirement more than single men?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 47-71, February.
    11. Mette Ejrnæs & Stefan Hochguertel, 2008. "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance: Empirical Evidence from a Large Administrative Sample," CAM Working Papers 2008-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
    12. Salazar, C, 2007. "Determinantes de la Adopción Voluntaria del Seguro de Cesantía [Determinants of Voluntary Adoptions of Unemployment Insurance]," MPRA Paper 7693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Mette Ejrnaes & Stefan Hochguertel, 2008. "Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-065/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 12 Aug 2011.
    14. Patrick Bennett & Amine Ouazad, 2020. "Job Displacement, Unemployment, and Crime: Evidence from Danish Microdata and Reforms [The Link between Human Capital, Mass Layoffs, and Firm Deaths]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(5), pages 2182-2220.
    15. Laust Høgedahl, 2014. "The Ghent effect for whom? Mapping the variations of the Ghent effect across different trade unions in Denmark," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(6), pages 469-485, November.
    16. Wildeman, Christopher & Fallesen, Peter, 2017. "The effect of lowering welfare payment ceilings on children's risk of out-of-home placement," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 82-90.
    17. Bogedan, Claudia, 2006. "Readjusting the social democratic welfare state in Denmark 1973 - 2003," TranState Working Papers 40, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
    18. Leschke, Janine, 2007. "Gender differences in unemployment insurance coverage: A comparative analysis," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2007-106, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    19. Mette Ejrnæs & Stefan Hochguertel, 2022. "Identifying Risk-based Selection in Social Insurance: New Approaches and Findings," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-040/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    20. Fallesen, Peter & Geerdsen, Lars Pico & Imai, Susumu & Tranæs, Torben, 2018. "The effect of active labor market policies on crime: Incapacitation and program effects," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 263-286.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unemployment insurance; social assistance; unemployment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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