Choice in insurance markets: a Pigouvian approach to social insurance design
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- Nathaniel Hendren & Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 457-486, August.
- Landais, Camille & Hendren, Nathan & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2020. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 15285, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nathaniel Hendren & Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2020. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," NBER Working Papers 27842, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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"Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 165-195, July.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Seibold, Arthur & Seitz, Sebastian & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2022.
"Privatizing disability insurance,"
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- Arthur Seibold & Sebastian Seitz & Sebastian Siegloch, 2022. "Privatizing Disability Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 9979, CESifo.
- Seibold, Arthur & Seitz, Sebastian & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2022. "Privatizing Disability Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 15579, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Seibold, Arthur & Seitz, Sebastian & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2022. "Privatizing Disability Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 17568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Arthur Seibold & Sebastian Seitz & Sebastian Siegloch, 2022. "Privatizing Disability Insurance," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 190, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Koning, Pierre & van Lent, Max, 2022. "Workers' Moral Hazard and Insurer Effort in Disability Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 15164, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco & Reyniers, Diane, 2021.
"Too much trade: The hidden problem of adverse selection,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- De Meza, David & Reito, Francesco & Reyniers, Diane J., 2021. "Too much trade: the hidden problem of adverse selection," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112574, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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More about this item
Keywords
adverse selection; moral hazard; optimal mandate; Pigouvian subsidy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Statistics
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