Risk-based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications
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- Camille Landais & Arash Nekoei & Peter Nilsson & David Seim & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Risk-Based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1315-1355, April.
- Camille Landais & Arash Nekoei & Peter Nilsson & David Seim & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2017. "Risk-Based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications," CEP Discussion Papers dp1503, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Landais, Camille & Nekoei, Arash & Nilsson, Peter & Seim, David & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2020. "Risk-based selection in unemployment insurance: evidence and Implications," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 108448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Camille Landais & Arash Nekoei & Peter Nilsson & David Seim & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2017. "Risk-based selection and unemployment insurance: evidence and implications," IFS Working Papers W17/22, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Landais, Camille & Nekoei, Arash & Nilsson, Peter & Seim, David & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2017. "Risk-based selection in unemployment insurance: evidence and implications," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87779, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Landais, Camille & Nekoei, Arash & Nilsson, Peter & Seim, David & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2017. "Risk-based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications," CEPR Discussion Papers 12364, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Landais, Camille & Nekoei, Arash & Nilsson, Peter & Seim, David & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2017. "Risk-based selection in unemployment insurance: evidence and implications," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86596, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Jason S. Anquandah & Leonid V. Bogachev, 2019. "Optimal Stopping and Utility in a Simple Model of Unemployment Insurance," Papers 1902.06175, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2019.
- Lombardi, Stefano, 2019. "Threat effects of monitoring and unemployment insurance sanctions: evidence from two reforms," Working Paper Series 2019:22, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
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More about this item
Keywords
Adverse Selection; Unemployment Insurance; Mandate; Subsidy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IAS-2017-10-15 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2017-10-15 (Labour Economics)
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