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Risk-Based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications

Author

Listed:
  • Camille Landais
  • Arash Nekoei
  • Peter Nilsson
  • David Seim
  • Johannes Spinnewijn

Abstract

This paper studies whether adverse selection can rationalize a universal mandate for unemployment insurance (UI). Building on a unique feature of the unemployment policy in Sweden, where workers can opt for supplemental UI coverage above a minimum mandate, we provide the first direct evidence for adverse selection in UI and derive its implications for UI design. We find that the unemployment risk is more than twice as high for workers who buy supplemental coverage. Exploiting variation in risk and prices, we show how 25–30 percent of this correlation is driven by risk-based selection, with the remainder driven by moral hazard. Due to the moral hazard and despite the adverse selection we find that mandating the supplemental coverage to individuals with low willingness-to-pay would be suboptimal. We show under which conditions a design leaving choice to workers would dominate a UI system with a single mandate. In this design, using a subsidy for supplemental coverage is optimal and complementary to the use of a minimum mandate.

Suggested Citation

  • Camille Landais & Arash Nekoei & Peter Nilsson & David Seim & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Risk-Based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1315-1355, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:4:p:1315-55
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180820
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    Cited by:

    1. Seibold, Arthur & Seitz, Sebastian & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2022. "Privatizing Disability Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 17568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Jason S. Anquandah & Leonid V. Bogachev, 2019. "Optimal Stopping and Utility in a Simple Model of Unemployment Insurance," Papers 1902.06175, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2019.
    3. von Buxhoeveden, Mathias, 2019. "Unemployment insurance and wage formation," Working Paper Series 2019:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    4. Adrian Adermon & Lisa Laun & Patrik Lind & Martin Olsson & Jan Sauermann & Anna Sjögren, 2024. "Earnings Losses and the Role of the Welfare State During the COVID‐19 Pandemic: Evidence from Sweden," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 70(4), pages 981-1010, December.
    5. Mette Ejrnæs & Stefan Hochguertel, 2022. "Identifying Risk-based Selection in Social Insurance: New Approaches and Findings," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-040/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, 2023. "Empirical analyses of selection and welfare in insurance markets: a self-indulgent survey," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 48(2), pages 167-191, September.
    7. Jason S. Anquandah & Leonid V. Bogachev, 2019. "Optimal Stopping and Utility in a Simple Modelof Unemployment Insurance," Risks, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-41, September.
    8. Hartmann, Ida Maria & Leth-Petersen, Søren, 2024. "Subjective unemployment expectations and (self-)insurance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    9. Lombardi, Stefano, 2019. "Threat effects of monitoring and unemployment insurance sanctions: evidence from two reforms," Working Paper Series 2019:22, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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