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Utilization and Selection in an Ancillaries Health Insurance Market

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  • Nathan Kettlewell

Abstract

I study two important aspects of the Australian private ancillaries health insurance (PAHI) market—moral hazard and self‐selection. PAHI covers out‐of‐hospital health services including dental, optometry, physiotherapy, and chiropractic. Using instrumental variables methods, I find evidence that PAHI increases utilization, particularly for dental, physiotherapy, chiropractic, osteopathy, and acupuncture. I also find evidence of selection effects—both adverse and favorable. Several variables jointly predict a person's propensity to insure and to utilize health services. There is little evidence of self‐selection based on the joint probability of different health services, which has important implications for understanding the commercial success of PAHI.

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  • Nathan Kettlewell, 2019. "Utilization and Selection in an Ancillaries Health Insurance Market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 86(4), pages 989-1017, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:86:y:2019:i:4:p:989-1017
    DOI: 10.1111/jori.12250
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    Cited by:

    1. Ha Trong Nguyen & Huong Thu Le & Luke Connelly & Francis Mitrou, 2023. "Accuracy of self‐reported private health insurance coverage," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(12), pages 2709-2729, December.
    2. Nathan Kettlewell, 2020. "Policy Choice and Product Bundling in a Complicated Health Insurance Market: Do People Get It Right?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 55(2), pages 566-610.
    3. Kettlewell, Nathan, 2020. "Subjective Expectations for Health Service Use and Consequences for Health Insurance Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 13445, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Nayak, Bishwajit & Bhattacharyya, Som Sekhar & Krishnamoorthy, Bala, 2021. "Explicating the role of emerging technologies and firm capabilities towards attainment of competitive advantage in health insurance service firms," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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