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Unemployment Insurance and Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information: Theory and Facts

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  • Oswald, Andrew J

Abstract

The paper provides evidence to show that many U.S. labor contracts havelittle or no private unemployment insurance provision. A model of an optional contract under asymmetric information, with no private unemployment insurance, is presented. Underemployment and involuntaryunemployment may coexist. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Oswald, Andrew J, 1986. "Unemployment Insurance and Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information: Theory and Facts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 365-377, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:76:y:1986:i:3:p:365-77
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pisauro, Giuseppe, 2002. "The beneficial effects of generous unemployment benefits on profits and employment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 739-760, November.
    2. Olivier Davanne & Thierry Pujol, 1996. "Assurance et échanges de risque sur le marché du travail," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 291(1), pages 151-169.
    3. Jonathan P. Thomas, 1999. "Fair Pay and a Wagebill Arguement for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 199919, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.
    4. Nathaniel Hendren & Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 457-486, August.
    5. Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2002. "Informal Family Insurance And The Design Of The Welfare State," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 481-503, July.
    6. Du Caju, Philip & Kosma, Theodora & Lawless, Martina & Messina, Julián & Rõõm, Tairi, 2013. "Why Firms Avoid Cutting Wages: Survey Evidence from European Firms," Research Technical Papers 03/RT/13, Central Bank of Ireland.
    7. Jan Babecký & Philip Du Caju & Theodora Kosma & Martina Lawless & Julián Messina & Tairi Rõõm, 2010. "Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity: Survey Evidence from European Firms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(4), pages 884-910, December.
    8. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald & Peter Sanfey, 1996. "Wages, Profits, and Rent-Sharing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 227-251.
    9. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1987. "Implicit contracts, on-the-job search and involuntary unemployment," Working Papers (Old Series) 8712, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    10. Hanes, Christopher, 2010. "The rise and fall of the sliding scale, or why wages are no longer indexed to product prices," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 49-67, January.
    11. Nils Gottfries & Tomas Sjostrom, 2000. "Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages and Involuntary Unemployment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(4), pages 669-688, December.
    12. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 2002. "The Insider-Outsider Theory: A Survey," IZA Discussion Papers 534, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Dierk Herzer, 2014. "Unions and income inequality: a heterogenous cointegration and causality analysis," Working Paper 146/2014, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    14. Oswald, Andrew J., 1996. "A Conjecture on the Explanation for High Unemployment in the Industrialized Nations: Part I," Economic Research Papers 268744, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    15. Yao Chen & Felix Ward, 2022. "Output Divergence in Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Euro Area Growing Apart?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-031/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    16. Marco de Pinto & Jörg Lingens, 2014. "Unionization, Information Asymmetry and the De-location of Firms," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201412, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    17. Robert MacCulloch, 2001. "Does Social Insurance Help Secure Property Rights?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 31, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    18. Marco de Pinto & Jörg Lingens, 2019. "Unionization, information asymmetry and the de‐location of firms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 1782-1823, November.
    19. Stephen Millard & Srdan Tatomir, 2015. "Firms’ adjustment during 2010–13: evidence from the Wage Dynamics Survey," Bank of England working papers 568, Bank of England.
    20. Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2001. "Alternative Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung: das Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten und des Vereinigten Königreichs," Kiel Working Papers 1032, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    21. Jan Babecky & Kamil Dybczak, 2012. "Real Wage Flexibility in the European Union: New Evidence from the Labour Cost Data," Working Papers 2012/01, Czech National Bank, Research and Statistics Department.
    22. W. Henry Chiu & Edi Karni, 1998. "Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 806-827, August.
    23. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau, 1994. "Time inconsistency as a rationale for public unemployment insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(2), pages 107-126, October.
    24. Richard Martin & Steeve Mongrain & Sean Parkinson, 2004. "Severance Payments and Unemployment Insurance: A Commitment Issue," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(4), pages 593-606, October.
    25. Adriana Cassoni, 1997. "A brief survey on the role of trade unions in labour market," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0697, Department of Economics - dECON.

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