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Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard

  • Jullien, Bruno
  • Salanié, Bernard
  • Salanié, François

Principal-agent models of moral hazard have been developed under the assumption that the principal knows the agent's risk-aversion. This Paper extends the moral hazard model to the case when the agent's risk-aversion is his private information, so that the model also exhibits adverse selection. We characterize the optimal menu of contracts; while its detailed properties depend on the setting, we show that some of them must hold for all environments. In particular, the power of incentives always decreases with risk-aversion. We also characterize the relationship between the outside option and the optimal contracts. We then apply our results to insurance, managerial incentive pay and corporate governance.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3076.

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Date of creation: Oct 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3076
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  12. Chassagnon, A. & Chiappori, P.A., 1994. "Insurance Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition," Papers 28, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
  13. Stewart, Jay, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 193-208, April.
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  19. De Meza, D. & Webb, D.C., 2000. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Market," Discussion Papers 0007, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
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