IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Coûts de l’autoprotection et équilibre d’un marché de l’assurance concurrentiel

  • Kambia-Chopin, Bidénam

    (Thema)

This paper considers a competitive insurance market under moral hazard and adverse selection, in which both the agent’s preventive effort and self protection costs are unobservable by the insurance companies. We show that the agent provides the same level of self-protection than without adverse selection. The agent who has a higher marginal cost is proposed his moral hazard contract whereas adverse selection may make the lower marginal cost agent’s coverage to decrease. Finally, equilibrium may not exist. Nous considérons un marché concurrentiel de l’assurance en présence d’aléa moral dans lequel le niveau du coût de l’autoprotection de l’assuré est son information privée. Nous caractérisons alors l’équilibre en contrats du marché en supposant qu’il existe deux types d’agents : un type à faible coût marginal de l’effort et un autre dont le coût marginal est élevé. D’une part, nous montrons que le niveau de l’autoprotection de l’agent à l’équilibre est le même que dans la situation d’aléa moral pur. D’autre part, nous montrons qu’à l’équilibre les agents dont le coût marginal de l’effort est élevé obtiennent le même contrat que dans la situation d’aléa moral pur alors que l’autre type d’agents peut obtenir une couverture d’assurance plus faible. Enfin, l’existence de l’équilibre n’est pas toujours garantie.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/009903ar
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 79 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (Septembre)
Pages: 327-347

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:79:y:2003:i:3:p:327-347
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.scse.ca/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, 2003. "Aléa moral et selection adverse sur le marché de l’assurance," Working Papers 2003-39, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  2. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 2484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard & Salanié, François, 2001. "Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 3076, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. John G. Riley, 1976. "Informational Equilibrium," UCLA Economics Working Papers 071, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
  6. Stewart, Jay, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 193-208, April.
  7. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1991. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 3588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:79:y:2003:i:3:p:327-347. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruce Shearer)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.