The Welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Addison, J.T. & Barrett, C.R. & Siebert, W.S., 1995.
"Mandated Benefits, Welfare, and Heterogeneous Firms,"
Discussion Papers
95-33, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Addison, John T. & Barrett, Charles Richard & Siebert, William Stanley, 1998. "Mandated benefits, welfare, and heterogeneous firms," ZEW Discussion Papers 98-46, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- John Addison & Richard Barrett & W. Siebert, 2006.
"Building blocks in the economics of mandates,"
Portuguese Economic Journal,
Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 5(2), pages 69-87, August.
- Addison, J.T. & Barrett, C.R. & Siebert, W.S., 2000. "Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates," Discussion Papers 00-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- John T. Addison & C. R. Barrett & W. S. Siebert, 2005. "Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates," GEMF Working Papers 2005-16, GEMF, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra.
- Addison, John T. & Barrett, C. R. & Siebert, W. Stanley, 2005. "Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates," IZA Discussion Papers 1866, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2000.
"Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard,"
Working Papers
2000-41, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard & Salanié, François, 2001. "Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 3076, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard & Salanié, François, 2001. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 131, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Islam, Zahirul & Turvey, Calum G. & Hoy, Michael, 1999. "A Model Of Agricultural Insurance In Evaluating Asymmetric Information Problems," Working Papers 34103, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Adeyemi Esuola & Michael Hoy & Zahirul Islam & Calum G. Turvey, 2007.
"Evaluating the effects of asymmetric information in a model of crop insurance,"
Agricultural Finance Review,
Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 341-356, November.
- Michael Hoy & Adeyemi Esuola & Zahirul Islam & Calum G. Turvey, 2007. "Evaluating the Effects of Asymmetric Information in a Model of Crop Insurance," Working Papers 0706, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2016.
"Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(2), pages 305-370.
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2012. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening and Multitasking," IAST Working Papers 12-03, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised Mar 2013.
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2013. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," NBER Working Papers 18936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2013. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," IZA Discussion Papers 7321, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2012. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening and Multitasking," IDEI Working Papers 756, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Mar 2013.
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2012. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening and Multitasking," TSE Working Papers 12-367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2013.
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2013. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," CEPR Discussion Papers 9419, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2010.
"Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity,"
Economic Theory,
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 187-211, August.
- Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2009. "Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Wealth Heterogeneity," SOI - Working Papers 0907, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2009.
- Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane & Rollins, Kimberly S., 2001. "Private Resource Management And Public Trust: Optimal Resource Conservation Contracts Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 34141, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Mourad Afif & Sandrine Spaeter, 2010. "Adverse Selection, Emission Permits and Optimal Price Differentiation," Working Papers of BETA 2010-07, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Kambia-Chopin, Bidénam, 2003. "Coûts de l’autoprotection et équilibre d’un marché de l’assurance concurrentiel," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 79(3), pages 327-347, Septembre.
- Sandrine Ollier, 2006. "Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 265-286.
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
- Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2007. "Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(1), pages 151-169, January.
- Udo Schneider & Jürgen Zerth, 2011. "Improving Prevention Compliance through Appropriate Incentives: Theoretical Modelling and Empirical Evidence," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 147(I), pages 71-106, March.
- Jay Stewart, 1999. "Adverse Selection and Pay Compression," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(4), pages 885-899, April.
- Udo Schneider, 2005. "Asymmetric Information and Outcome-based Compensation in Health Care – Theoretical Implications," HEW 0501006, EconWPA.
- Schneider, Udo & Zerth, Jürgen, 2008. "Improving prevention compliance through appropriate incentives," MPRA Paper 8280, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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