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Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée

Listed author(s):
  • Sandrine Ollier
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    Although legal restrictions limiting the workers’ liability are made to increase their welfare, we show that they may lead to a perverse effect when more productive workers cross subsidize less productive workers. A generalized agency model is analyzed and used to show that exonerating a wealthy agent from liability for damages caused during the execution of the contract decreases the more productive workers’ expected utility in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model.

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    Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.

    Volume (Year): 72 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 265-286

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    Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_723_0265
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm

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    1. Stewart, Jay, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 193-208, April.
    2. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey, 1992. "Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 595-615.
    3. Picard, Pierre, 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 305-331, August.
    4. Faynzilberg, Peter S. & Kumar, Praveen, 1997. "Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 15-39, October.
    5. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    7. James Vercammen, 2002. "Welfare-Improving Adverse Selection in Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1017-1033, November.
    8. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    9. Peter S. Faynzilberg & Praveen Kumar, 2000. "original papers : On the generalized principal-agent problem: Decomposition and existence results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(1), pages 23-58.
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