Aléa moral et selection adverse sur le marché de l'assurance

This paper considers a competitive insurance market under moral hazard and adverseselection, in which both the agent's preventive effort and self protection costs are unobservableby the insurance companies. We show that the results of the adverse selection model(Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)) can apply to our context even if it involves moral hazard.The agents with a higher marginal cost opt for a lower self protection level, so their accidentprobability is the highest. They are proposed their moral hazard contract. Adverse selectionmakes the others agents' coverage to decrease, increasing likewise their preventive action.We compare in a second time our results under moral hazard and adverse selection to theequilibrium in a market where prevention could be observed. Under reasonable assumptions,the conclusions of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) seem very robust.