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Improving Prevention Compliance through Appropriate Incentives: Theoretical Modelling and Empirical Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Udo Schneider
  • Jürgen Zerth

Abstract

This paper explores the effects of insurance parameters and complementary information environment on the patient's primary prevention activity. The theoretical model is based on a principal-agent setting in which the patient acts as an agent in deciding about his prevention efforts. The insurer chooses the coverage level and therefore the level of patient's cost sharing and decides on his monitoring activities. The empirical analysis looks at the patient's prevention decision in the case of smoking. Using a hazard model in discrete time, the decision to change behaviour depends on health status, education, age and working time but not on the insurance system.

Suggested Citation

  • Udo Schneider & Jürgen Zerth, 2011. "Improving Prevention Compliance through Appropriate Incentives: Theoretical Modelling and Empirical Evidence," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 147(I), pages 71-106, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:2011-i-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    incentives in prevention; information distribution; hazard model;

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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