Why Do Some Bikers Wear a Helmet and Others Don't? Evidence from Delhi, India
In many domains risky health behavior is still only poorly understood. Analysis is often plagued by incomplete data and a general lack of information. In this study; we try to understand the determinants of helmet use among motorcyclists in Delhi; a context in which road safety is very low. We use a very detailed data set collected especially for the purpose of the study. To guide our empirical analysis; we rely on a simple model in which drivers decide on their speed and helmet use. The empirical findings suggest that risk averse individuals are more likely to wear a helmet. We do not find any systematic effect of risk aversion on speed. Both findings are coherent with our theoretical model. Helmet use also increases with education. Drivers who show a higher awareness of road risks; because for instance; they are better informed about Delhi's actual road traffc accident fatality and injury rates; are both more likely to wear a helmet and to speed less. In turn; those drivers who show a high level of unawareness take the highest risks. Controlling for risk awareness; we observe that drivers tend to compensate between speed and helmet use. The most obvious solution to India's road safety problem and the related high social costs that result from it is to enforce the helmet law and speed limits. An alternative strategy; and probably more feasible in the current context; is to design interventions which raise awareness of road risks. Improvements to the road infrastructure are also a possible solution but these measures bear the risk that drivers will react to the improved road safety by either increasing speed or lowering helmet use.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00871749|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dionne, G. & Eeckhoudt, L., 1984.
"Self-Insurance, Self-Protection and Increased Risk Aversion,"
Cahiers de recherche
8424, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Dionne, Georges & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1985. "Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 39-42.
- DIONNE, George & EECKHOUDT, Louis, . "Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion," CORE Discussion Papers RP -623, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bernd Hardeweg & Lukas Menkhoff & Hermann Waibel, 2013.
"Experimentally Validated Survey Evidence on Individual Risk Attitudes in Rural Thailand,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(4), pages 859 - 888.
- Hardeweg, Bernd & Menkhoff, Lukas & Waibel, Hermann, 2011. "Experimentally-validated survey evidence on individual risk attitudes in rural Thailand," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-464, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug..
- van der Pol, Marjon & Ruggeri, Matteo, 2008. "Is risk attitude outcome specific within the health domain?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 706-717, May.
- Robert S. Chirinko & Edward P. Harper, 1993.
"Buckle up or slow down? New estimates of offsetting behavior and their implications for automobile safety regulation,"
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 270-296.
- Robert S. Chirinko & Edward P. Harper, Jr., 1992. "Buckle-Up or Slow-Down? New Estimates of Offsetting Behavior and Their Implications for Automobile Safety Regulation," Working Papers 9207, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
- Russell S. Sobel & Todd M. Nesbit, 2007. "Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 71-84, July.
- Lee, Kangoh, 1998. "Risk Aversion and Self-Insurance-cum-Protection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 139-50, November.
- Levon Barseghyan & Jeffrey Prince & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2011. "Are Risk Preferences Stable across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 591-631, April.
- Peterson, Steven & Hoffer, George & Millner, Edward, 1995. "Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 251-64, October.
- David Roodman, 2011. "Fitting fully observed recursive mixed-process models with cmp," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 11(2), pages 159-206, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00871749. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.