Primary Seat-Belt Laws and Driver Behavior: Evidence from Accident Data
This paper investigates the offsetting effect theory, using individual-level accident data to analyze how drivers respond to seat-belt laws. I find that drivers drive their vehicles more carefully when more stringent seat-belt laws are in effect. I also find that careful driving is not associated with pedestrian involvement in accidents. Using synthetic panel data, I find that the change in the laws results in an increased number of careful drivers and a decreased number of careless drivers in accidents. The results show that the offsetting effects are weaker than expected or may not exist in accidents.
|Date of creation:||14 Sep 2013|
|Date of revision:||15 Sep 2013|
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