The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers
This article investigates the connection between the apparently uncorrelated issues of tax evasion and privatisation in a political economy framework. We first consider how the political process – given a country's level of development and income distribution – will affect the efficiency of the tax system. We then discuss the impact of the efficiency of the taxation system on the outcomes of privatisation. We consider under which condition privatisation will proceed, and who will be the political supporters as well as the main winners of the privatisation process. Moreover, we investigate the impact of different forms of corruption both on the initial public support for privatisation, as well as on its long term political sustainability. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006
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Volume (Year): 126 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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