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Property rights, rent-seeking and aggregate outcomes in transition economies

  • Cheikbossian, Guillaume

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economic Systems.

Volume (Year): 27 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 271-288

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecosys:v:27:y:2003:i:3:p:271-288
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  1. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," NBER Working Papers 3530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Gerard Roland & Thierry Verdier, 1999. "Law Enforcement and Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 262, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  4. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1816, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," NBER Working Papers 9282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 347-352, May.
  7. Jan Svejnar, 2001. "Transition Economies: Performances and Challenges," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 415, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  8. Acemoglu, Daron, 1995. "Reward structures and the allocation of talent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 17-33, January.
  9. Murphy, Kevin M. & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Industrialization and the Big Push," Scholarly Articles 3606235, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Dieter B”s & Phillipp Harms, 1995. "Mass Privatization, Management Control and Efficiency," Discussion Paper Serie A 475, University of Bonn, Germany.
  11. Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  12. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov, 1999. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 227, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  13. Gérard Roland, 2004. "Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026268148x, March.
  14. Jean Tirole, 1991. "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and the Economics of Transition," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 221-268 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Roland, Gérard & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Irreversibility and Critical Mass Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 612, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May.
  17. Philippe Aghion & Olivier J. Blanchard, 1998. "On privatization methods in Eastern Europe and their implications," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 6(1), pages 87-99, 05.
  18. Hansen, Nico A., 1997. "Privatization, technology choice and aggregate outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 425-442, June.
  19. Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2002. "Machiavellian Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 240-258, March.
  20. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
  21. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1994. "Voucher privatization," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 249-266, April.
  22. Muller, Holger M & Warneryd, Karl, 2001. "Inside versus Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 527-41, Autumn.
  23. Laban, Raul & Wolf, Holger C, 1993. "Large-Scale Privatization in Transition Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1199-1210, December.
  24. Warneryd, Karl, 1998. "Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 435-450, September.
  25. John S. Earle & Saul Estrin, 1995. "Alternative ownership forms: the impact on restructuring," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 3(1), pages 111-115, 03.
  26. Baumol, William J, 1990. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 893-921, October.
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