IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecmode/v37y2014icp16-22.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rent seeking opportunities and economic growth in transitional economies

Author

Listed:
  • Iqbal, Nasir
  • Daly, Vince

Abstract

This study empirically explores the growth effects of rent seeking activity (RSA) for a group of 52 developing/transitional countries, using a dynamic panel data approach. The modeling framework is a Mankiw–Romer–Weil (MRW) conditional convergence model with path dependence and augmented by measures of the opportunities for RSA, namely indices for the extent of democracy and corruption control. The empirical analysis suggests that, for this group of countries, RSA retards economic growth, in that (i) democratic institutions — which are inimical to RSA, are growth enhancing and (ii) reduction in the extent of corruption is growth-enhancing if supported by well-developed democratic institutions. We find also that health is more relevant than educational participation as a measure of human capital development, that path dependence is absent where democracy is weak, and that the MRW model characterizes the growth process more successfully in the stronger democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Iqbal, Nasir & Daly, Vince, 2014. "Rent seeking opportunities and economic growth in transitional economies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 16-22.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:37:y:2014:i:c:p:16-22
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.10.025
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999313004525
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econmod.2013.10.025?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Romer, Paul M, 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-1037, October.
    2. Stephen Bond & Anke Hoeffler & Jonathan Temple, 2001. "GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models," Economics Papers 2001-W21, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    3. Mork, Knut Anton, 1993. " Living with Lobbying: A Growth Policy Co-opted by Lobbyists Can Be Better than No Growth Policy at All," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(4), pages 597-605, December.
    4. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
    5. Narayan, Paresh Kumar & Narayan, Seema & Smyth, Russell, 2011. "Does democracy facilitate economic growth or does economic growth facilitate democracy? An empirical study of Sub-Saharan Africa," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 900-910, May.
    6. Harold J. Brumm, 1999. "Rent Seeking and Economic Growth: Evidence from the States," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 19(1), pages 7-16, Spring/Su.
    7. Aidt, Toke & Dutta, Jayasri & Sena, Vania, 2008. "Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-220, June.
    8. David de la Croix & Clara Delavallade, 2014. "Why corrupt governments may receive more foreign aid," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 51-66, January.
    9. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "Foreign aid and rent-seeking," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 437-461, August.
    10. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    11. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Weill, Laurent, 2010. "Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 244-259, March.
    12. Anderson, Gary Michael & Rowley, Charles K & Tollison, Robert D, 1988. "Rent Seeking and the Restriction of Human Exchange," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 83-100, January.
    13. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
    14. Robert J. Barro, 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 407-443.
    15. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    16. N. Gregory Mankiw & David Romer & David N. Weil, 1992. "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 407-437.
    17. Pius V. Fischer, 2006. "Rent-Seeking, Institutions and Reforms In Africa," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-0-387-33773-9, November.
    18. Park, Hyun & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2005. "Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 830-850, December.
    19. Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2003. "Democracy, rent seeking, public spending and growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 445-466, March.
    20. Sara Corujo & Marta Simões, 2012. "Democracy and Growth: Evidence for Portugal (1960–2001)," Transition Studies Review, Springer;Central Eastern European University Network (CEEUN), vol. 18(3), pages 512-528, March.
    21. Hartwig, Jochen, 2010. "Is health capital formation good for long-term economic growth? - Panel Granger-causality evidence for OECD countries," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 314-325, March.
    22. Evgeni Peev & Dennis C. Mueller, 2012. "Democracy, Economic Freedom and Growth in Transition Economies," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 371-407, August.
    23. Bond, Stephen & Bowsher, Clive & Windmeijer, Frank, 2001. "Criterion-based inference for GMM in autoregressive panel data models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 379-388, December.
    24. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2003. "Property rights, rent-seeking and aggregate outcomes in transition economies," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 271-288, September.
    25. Philip Grossman, 1988. "Government and economic growth: A non-linear relationship," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 193-200, February.
    26. Levine, Ross & Renelt, David, 1992. "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 942-963, September.
    27. Stephen Bond & Anke Hoeffler, 2001. "GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models," Economics Series Working Papers 2001-W21, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    28. Ignacio Del Rosal, 2011. "The Empirical Measurement Of Rent‐Seeking Costs," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 298-325, April.
    29. Rama, Martin, 1993. "Rent seeking and economic growth : A theoretical model and some empirical evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 35-50, October.
    30. Mendez, Fabio & Sepulveda, Facundo, 2006. "Corruption, growth and political regimes: Cross country evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 82-98, March.
    31. José Aixalá & Gema Fabro, 2009. "Economic freedom, civil liberties, political rights and growth: a causality analysis," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 165-178, September.
    32. Kiviet, Jan F., 1995. "On bias, inconsistency, and efficiency of various estimators in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 53-78, July.
    33. Spinesi, Luca, 2009. "Rent-seeking bureaucracies, inequality, and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 244-257, November.
    34. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-414, May.
    35. Scully, Gerald W, 1991. "Rent-Seeking in U.S. Government Budgets, 1900-88," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(1), pages 99-106, April.
    36. Shankha Chakraborty & Era Dabla-Norris, 2006. "Rent Seeking," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(1), pages 1-2.
    37. Gelb, A & Knight, John B & Sabot, R H, 1991. "Public Sector Employment, Rent Seeking and Economic Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1186-1199, September.
    38. David Laband & John Sophocleus, 1988. "The social cost of rent-seeking: First estimates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 269-275, September.
    39. Anwar, Sajid & Cooray, Arusha, 2012. "Financial development, political rights, civil liberties and economic growth: Evidence from South Asia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 974-981.
    40. Caselli, Francesco & Esquivel, Gerardo & Lefort, Fernando, 1996. "Reopening the Convergence Debate: A New Look at Cross-Country Growth Empirics," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 363-389, September.
    41. Sachs, Jeffrey D & Warner, Andrew M, 1997. "Fundamental Sources of Long-Run Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 184-188, May.
    42. Durden, Garey, 1990. "The Effect of Rent-Seeking on Family Income Levels: Some Suggestive Empirical Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 285-291, December.
    43. Knowles, Stephen & Owen, P. Dorian, 1995. "Health capital and cross-country variation in income per capita in the Mankiw-Romer-Weil model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 99-106, April.
    44. Ismail M.Cole & M. Arshad Chawdhry, 2002. "Rent Seeking and Economic Growth:Evidence from a Panel of U.S.States," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 22(2), pages 211-228, Fall.
    45. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2007. "Rent Seeking And Democracy: Empirical Evidence For Uruguay," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 592-601, July.
    46. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    47. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    48. Anderson, T. W. & Hsiao, Cheng, 1982. "Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 47-82, January.
    49. Paul M. Romer, 1994. "The Origins of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 3-22, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. E. Tsanana & X. Chapsa & C. Katrakilidis, 2016. "Is growth corrupted or bureaucratic? Panel evidence from the enlarged EU," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(33), pages 3131-3147, July.
    2. Saima Nawaz & Nasir Iqbal & Muhammad Arshad Khan, 2014. "The Impact of Institutional Quality on Economic Growth: Panel Evidence," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 53(1), pages 15-31.
    3. Petreski, Marjan, 2009. "Analysis of exchange-rate regime effect on growth: theoretical channels and empirical evidence with panel data," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-49, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Sami Fethi & Hatice Imamoglu, 2021. "The impact of rent‐seeking on economic growth in the six geographic regions: Evidence from static and dynamic panel data analysis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 5349-5362, October.
    5. Andrew Hodge & Sriram Shankar & D. S. Prasada Rao & Alan Duhs, 2011. "Exploring the Links Between Corruption and Growth," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 474-490, August.
    6. Li, Hongbin & Yang, Zheyu & Yao, Xianguo & Zhang, Haifeng & Zhang, Junsen, 2012. "Entrepreneurship, private economy and growth: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 948-961.
    7. Magrini, Stefano, 2004. "Regional (di)convergence," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 62, pages 2741-2796, Elsevier.
    8. Slesman, Ly & Baharumshah, Ahmad Zubaidi & Ra'ees, Wahabuddin, 2015. "Institutional infrastructure and economic growth in member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 214-226.
    9. W. A. Naudé, 2004. "The effects of policy, institutions and geography on economic growth in Africa: an econometric study based on cross-section and panel data," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(6), pages 821-849.
    10. Nawaz, Saima, 2011. "The Institutions-Growth Nexus: Stages of Development," MPRA Paper 36961, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Indunil De Silva & Sudarno Sumarto, 2015. "Dynamics Of Growth, Poverty And Human Capital: Evidence From Indonesian Sub-National Data," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 40(2), pages 1-33, June.
    12. Durlauf, Steven N. & Quah, Danny T., 1999. "The new empirics of economic growth," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 235-308, Elsevier.
    13. Capolupo, Rosa, 2009. "The New Growth Theories and Their Empirics after Twenty Years," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 3, pages 1-72.
    14. Soukiazis, Elias & Antunes, Micaela, 2011. "Is foreign trade important for regional growth? Empirical evidence from Portugal," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1363-1373, May.
    15. Vu, Khuong M & Asongu, Simplice, 2020. "Backwardness advantage and economic growth in the information age: A cross-country empirical study," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    16. Jean-Louis ARCAND & Béatrice D'HOMBRES, 2002. "Explaining the Negative Coefficient Associated with Human Capital in Augmented Solow Growth Regressions," Working Papers 200227, CERDI.
    17. Ulaşan, Bülent, 2012. "Cross-country growth empirics and model uncertainty: An overview," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 6, pages 1-69.
    18. M. Alfano & A. Baraldi, 2015. "Is there an optimal level of political competition in terms of economic growth? Evidence from Italy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 263-285, April.
    19. Yongfu Huang, 2011. "Private investment and financial development in a globalized world," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 43-56, August.
    20. Zi Wen Vivien Wong & Fanyu Chen & Siong Hook Law & Normaz Wana Ismail, 2022. "The Effects Of Rent Seeking Activities On Economic Growth In Middle-Income Countries," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 25(2), pages 215-234, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent seeking; Economic growth; Transition economies; Dynamic panel model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:37:y:2014:i:c:p:16-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.