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The good, the bad, and the talented: Entrepreneurial talent and selfish behavior

  • Weitzel, Utz
  • Urbig, Diemo
  • Desai, Sameeksha
  • Sanders, Mark
  • Acs, Zoltan

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 76 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 64-81

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:76:y:2010:i:1:p:64-81
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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  37. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May.
  38. Baumol, William J, 1990. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 893-921, October.
  39. Daruvala, Dinky, 2010. "Would the right social preference model please stand up!," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 199-208, February.
  40. Chen, Chao C. & Greene, Patricia Gene & Crick, Ann, 1998. "Does entrepreneurial self-efficacy distinguish entrepreneurs from managers?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 295-316, July.
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