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The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm: A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada

In: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers

Author

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  • Randall Morck
  • Michael Percy
  • Gloria Tian
  • Bernard Yeung

Abstract

A panel of corporate ownership data, stretching back to 1902, shows that the Canadian corporate sector began the century with a predominance of large pyramidal corporate groups controlled by wealthy families or individuals. By mid-century, widely held firms predominated. But, from the 1970s on, pyramidal groups controlled by wealthy families and individuals resurge, restoring a situation similar to that a century earlier. Institutional factors underlying this resurgence are shown to have antecedents deep in the country's colonial past.
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Suggested Citation

  • Randall Morck & Michael Percy & Gloria Tian & Bernard Yeung, 2005. "The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm: A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada," NBER Chapters,in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 65-148 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10268
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
    2. Morck, Randall & Deniz Yavuz, M. & Yeung, Bernard, 2011. "Banking system control, capital allocation, and economy performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 264-283, May.
    3. Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck & Jungwook Shim & Yupana Wiwattanakantang, 2010. "Must Love Kill the Family Firm?," NBER Working Papers 16340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Randall Morck, 2005. "How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups The Double Taxation of Inter-corporate Dividends and other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy," NBER Chapters,in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 19, pages 135-179 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Randall Morck & Lloyd Steier, 2005. "The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction," NBER Chapters,in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 1-64 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala & Winnie Fung, 2005. "Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration," NBER Working Papers 11469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Chicaíza Becerra, Liliana Alejandra & García Molina, Mario & Romano Gómez, Giancarlo, 2011. "La aversión al riesgo en la toma de decisiones médicas: una revisión," REVISTA LECTURAS DE ECONOMÍA, UNIVERSIDAD DE ANTIOQUIA - CIE, November.
    8. Yoser Gadhoum, 2006. "Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, May.
    9. Randall Morck, 2009. "The Riddle of the Great Pyramids," NBER Working Papers 14858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Langlois, Richard N., 2013. "Business groups and the natural state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 14-26.
    11. Poutziouris, Panikkos & Savva, Christos S. & Hadjielias, Elias, 2015. "Family involvement and firm performance: Evidence from UK listed firms," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, pages 14-32.
    12. Mario García Molina, 2010. "Crisis y diversificación de los grupos empresariales colombianos a finales de los noventa," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO - ESCUELA DE ECONOMÍA 007571, UN - RCE - CID.
    13. Anita Anand & Frank Milne & Lynnette Purda, 2006. "Voluntary Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms," Working Papers 1112, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    14. Mueller, Holger M & Philippon, Thomas, 2006. "Concentrated Ownership and Labour Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5776, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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