Designing real terrorism futures
In July 2003, the Policy Analysis Market (PAM) was described as terrorism futures, and immediately cancelled. While PAM was not in fact designed to be terrorism futures, I here consider five design issues with implementing and using real terrorism futures: combinatorics, manipulation, moral hazard, hiding prices, and decision selection bias. As neither these nor other problems seem insurmountable, terrorism futures appears to be a technically realistic possibility. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006
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