Affecting Policy by Manipulating Prediction Markets: Experimental Evidence
Documented results indicate prediction markets effectively aggregate information and form accurate predictions. This has led to a proliferation of markets predicting everything from the results of elections to a company’s sales to movie box office receipts. Recent research suggests prediction markets are robust to manipulation attacks and resulting market outcomes improve forecast accuracy. However, we present evidence from the lab indicating that well funded, single minded manipulators can in fact destroy a prediction market’s ability to aggregate information. Our results clearly indicate that the usefulness of prediction markets as inputs to decision making may be limited.
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