“Public goods”: An exercise in calibration
This paper considers a measure of the “publicness” of goods and services implicit in responses that individuals make when asked about public sector spending. At the limit, all consumers consume equal amounts of a public good. Thus any differences between an individual's self-interest preferences and public-interest preferences cannot be based on differential provision, but only on differences in the individual's public- and self-interest utility functions. If we rule out the latter, self-interest and public-interest preferences for a pure public good are identical. Using sample survey data it is possible to calibrate the public good content of different public goods. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Preston, Ian & Ridge, Michael, 1995. "Demand for Local Public Spending: Evidence from the British Social Attitudes Survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 644-60, May.
- Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December.
- Craig, Steven G., 1987. "The impact of congestion on local public good production," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 331-353, April.
- Hudson, John & Jones, Philip R., 1994. "The importance of the 'ethical voter': An estimate of 'altruism'," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 499-509, October.
- Holcombe, R.G. & Sobel, R.S., 1993.
"Empirical Evidence on the Publicness of State Legislative Activities,"
1993_05_03, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Holcombe, Randall G & Sobel, Russell S, 1995. " Empirical Evidence on the Publicness of State Legislative Activities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 47-58, April.
- Naylor, Robin & Cripps, Martin, 1993.
"An economic theory of the open shop trade union,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1599-1620, December.
- Naylor, R. & Cripps, M., 1991. "An Economic Theory of the Open Shop Trade Union," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 372, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Sandler, Todd, 1977. "Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 443-60.
- Schram, Arthur J. H. C., 1990. "A dynamic model of voter behavior and the demand for public goods among social groups in Great Britain," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 147-182, March.
- Green, Francis & Machin, Stephen & Manning, Alan, 1996. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect: Can Dynamic Monopsony Provide an Explanation?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 433-55, July.
- Wyckoff, James H., 1984. "The nonexcludable publicness of primary and secondary public education," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 331-351, August.
- Coase, R H, 1974. "The Lighthouse in Economics," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 357-76, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:267-282. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.