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Macroeconomic conditions and committee re-election rates

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  • Joseph McGarrity

Abstract

The traditional literature on the link between the macro economy and House elections follows Kramer (1971) and assumes all members of the President's party are equally vulnerable to voter wrath caused by economic changes. Using Presidential Party return rates from 10 House committees over the time period 1916–1996, I find the impact of economic conditions at the polls varies by committee. Generally, committees that manage money or provide a public good are the most sensitive to economic fluctuations. Contrastingly, members of the Public Works committee and the Rules committee are more insulated from electoral culpability due to economic fluctuations. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph McGarrity, 2005. "Macroeconomic conditions and committee re-election rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 453-480, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:453-480
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3471-y
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