The Electoral Consequences of the Washington Consensus
This paper assesses how electoral outcomes in both presidential and legislative elections in Latin America have been affected by the adoption of economic policies that seek to improve macroeconomic stability and facilitate the functioning of markets. The database includes 17 Latin American countries for the period 1985-2002, and a total of 66 presidential and 81 legislative elections. The set of testable hypotheses is derived from a review of the literature and is structured around the hypothesis of economic voting. It is found that (i) the incumbent´s party is rewarded for reductions in the rate of inflation and, to a lesser extent, for increases in the rate of growth; (ii) the more fragmented or ideologically polarized the party system, the higher the electoral rewards of reducing the inflation rate or raising the economic growth rate; (iii) voters care not only about economic outcomes, but also about some of the policies adopted: while the electorate seems blind to macroeconomic policies such as fiscal or exchange-rate policies, it is averse to pro-market policies, irrespective of their effects on growth or inflation; and (iv) the electorate is more tolerant of pro-market reforms when the incumbent´s party has a more market-oriented ideology. These results suggest that reforming parties have paid a hefty price for the adoption of pro-market reforms, except when such reforms have been undertaken in conjunction with stabilization policies in high-inflation economies.
Volume (Year): Volume 5 Number 2 (2005)
Issue (Month): Spring 2005 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eduardo Lora, 2001.
"Structural reforms in Latin America: What has been reformed and how to measure it?,"
Research Department Publications
4287, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Eduardo Lora, 2001. "Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It," Research Department Publications 4293, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Sanjay Jain & Sharun W. Mukand, 2003. "Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 256-264, March.
- Richard H. Thaler & Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman & Alan Schwartz, 1997. "The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 647-661.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
- Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn, 1998. "New ways of looking at old issues: inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-287.
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2009. "Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 40(1 (Spring), pages 285-332.
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2004. "Why doesn't Capitalism flow to Poor Countries?," Others 0404005, EconWPA.
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2007. "Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?," NBER Working Papers 13164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1991. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1039-1061.
- Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 180-197, March.
- Mariano Tommasi, 1995. "Why Does it Take a Nixon to go to China?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 728, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China," Papers 30-97, Tel Aviv.
- Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997. "When does it take a Nixon to go to China?," Discussion Paper 1997-91, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Sergio Pernice & Federico Sturzenegger, 2004. "Culture and social resistance to reform: a theory about the endogeneity of public beliefs with an application to the case of Argentina," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 275, Universidad del CEMA.
- Eduardo Lora & Ugo Panizza & Myriam Quispe-Agnoli, 2004. "Reform fatigue: symptoms, reasons, and implications," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 2, pages 1-28.
- Wolfers, Justin, 2002. "Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections," Research Papers 1730, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:12-33_09 is not listed on IDEAS
- Alesina, Alberto & Londregan, John, 1993. "A Model of the Political Economy of the United States," Scholarly Articles 4552529, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," Working Papers 100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:69:y:1975:i:04:p:1232-1239_24 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:03:p:575-590_21 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:03:p:777-800_17 is not listed on IDEAS Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)