A partisan model of government expenditure
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides & Pantelis Kammas, 2009.
"Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure,"
2009_12, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Angelopoulos, Konstantinos & Economides, George & Kammas, Pantelis, 2009. "Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-09, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Zohal Hessami, 2013. "Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition: Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-27, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- J. Stephen Ferris, 2010. "Fiscal Policy from a Public Choice Perspective," Carleton Economic Papers 10-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Gupta, Sanjeev & Liu, Estelle X. & Mulas-Granados, Carlos, 2016. "Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 101-114.
- Ftergioti, Stamatia, 2017. "Neighbors and Friends: The Effect of Globalization on Party Positions," MPRA Paper 76662, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Yogesh Uppal & Amihai Glazer, 2015.
"Legislative Turnover, Fiscal Policy, And Economic Growth: Evidence From U.S. State Legislatures,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 91-107, January.
- Uppal, Yogesh & Glazer, Amihai, 2011. "Legislative turnover, fiscal policy, and economic growth: evidence from U.S. state legislatures," MPRA Paper 34186, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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