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Legislative turnover, fiscal policy, and economic growth: evidence from U.S. state legislatures

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  • Uppal, Yogesh
  • Glazer, Amihai

Abstract

An examination of how increased turnover among legislators in the fifty U.S. states affects fiscal policy and economic growth finds that it makes legislators short-sighted. Turnover increases the size of government by increasing the shares of both total spending and taxes in income. In particular, turnover increases capital expenditure and income taxes, both of which may cause long-run distortions in the economy. Further, increased turnover, by resulting in inefficient fiscal policy, reduces long-term economic growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Uppal, Yogesh & Glazer, Amihai, 2011. "Legislative turnover, fiscal policy, and economic growth: evidence from U.S. state legislatures," MPRA Paper 34186, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:34186
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    Cited by:

    1. Asako Yasushi & Matsubayashi Tetsuya & Ueda Michiko, 2016. "Legislative Term Limits and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(3), pages 1501-1538, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government size; State finances; Political competition; Legislative turnover; Composition of spending; short-sighted behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education

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