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Urban Extremism

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  • Amihai Glazer

Abstract

A current majority in some city, seeking to increase the probability that it will set policy in the following period, may initially adopt extremist policies that are particularly unattractive to the minority, leading some members of the minority to emigrate. This article develops a model to illustrate this idea, while providing examples that illustrate its relevance. ( JEL H70, H41, D72) The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Urban Extremism," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 307-318, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:24:y:2008:i:2:p:307-318
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewm058
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    1. Edward L. Glaeser, 2005. "The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 1-19, April.
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    5. Glazer, Amihai & Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1998. "The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(451), pages 1677-1685, November.
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
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    8. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Curley Effect," NBER Working Papers 8942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Glazer, Amihai, 1989. "Politics and the Choice of Durability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1207-1213, December.
    10. Hoyt, William H. & Lee, Kangoh, 2003. "Subsidies as sorting devices," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 436-457, May.
    11. Epple, Dennis & Romer, Thomas, 1991. "Mobility and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 828-858, August.
    12. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March.
    13. Aldrich, John H., 1983. "A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 974-990, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Salmon, 2013. "Horizontal competition in multilevel governmental settings," Working Papers hal-00830876, HAL.
    2. Bucovetsky, Sam & Glazer, Amihai, 2014. "Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 166-177.
    3. Yogesh Uppal & Amihai Glazer, 2015. "Legislative Turnover, Fiscal Policy, And Economic Growth: Evidence From U.S. State Legislatures," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 91-107, January.
    4. Giuranno, Michele G. & Rongili, Biswas, 2012. "Inter-jurisdictional migration and the size of government," MPRA Paper 42604, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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