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How fair is pricing perceived to be? An empirical study

  • Charles Raux


  • Stéphanie Souche


  • Yves Croissant


The perceived fairness of different rules for allocating scarce resources is analysed in two cases: seats on a high speed train and parking spaces in a company car park. Attitudes toward allocation rules depend on context. They vary according to: the educational level of respondents; the type of "good"; and the exceptional or recurring nature of scarcity. Peak pricing, administrative and lottery rules are seen as the most unfair, together with queuing in some cases. The moral rule is considered to be the fairest one, except by more educated people who prefer the compensation rule.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 139 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 227-240

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:1:p:227-240
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