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Paying vs. waiting in the pursuit of specific egalitarianism

Author

Listed:
  • Jeremy Clark
  • Bonggeun Kim

Abstract

We propose an allocation mechanism for publicly providing a private good such that the final allocation is independent of income yet increasing in strength of preference or need. The 'pay or wait' mechanism consists of offering the good for sale at two outlets. The 'queuing' outlet charges a low money price, but high waiting time per unit. The 'pricing' outlet charges a relatively high money price with rapid service. High wage individuals will opt for the pricing outlet, and low wage individuals the queuing outlet. If the policy maker stocks the outlets in proportion to the distribution of wage earners in the population, consumers of both wages will purchase the same amount on average, while those who value the good more relative to other goods will receive more of it. These outcomes are at risk if the good can be resold, but may be preserved if the policy maker can create transactions costs associated with resale. Copyright 2007 , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy Clark & Bonggeun Kim, 2007. "Paying vs. waiting in the pursuit of specific egalitarianism," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 486-512, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:59:y:2007:i:3:p:486-512
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpm004
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander, Matthew & MacLaren, Andrew & O’Gorman, Kevin & White, Christopher, 2012. "Priority queues: Where social justice and equity collide," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 875-884.
    2. Erwin Ooghe, 2019. "Markets, queues, and taxes," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 642022, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    3. Jeremy Clark & Bonggeun Kim, 2006. "Differential Time and Money Pricing as a Mechanism for In-kind Redistribution," Working Papers in Economics 06/07, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    4. Haizhen Mou, 2012. "The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(4), pages 1640-1666, November.
    5. Alejandro Corvalan, 2025. "The Distributional Consequences of Paid-Priority Queues," Papers 2512.10594, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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