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Deregulation despite transitional gains

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  • Diana W. Thomas

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Suggested Citation

  • Diana W. Thomas, 2009. "Deregulation despite transitional gains," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 329-340, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:140:y:2009:i:3:p:329-340
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9420-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Leeson & J. Subrick, 2006. "Robust political economy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 107-111, June.
    2. James A. Robinson & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 126-130, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Niklas Elert & Magnus Henrekson, 2021. "Entrepreneurship prompts institutional change in developing economies," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 34(1), pages 33-53, March.
    2. Bjørnskov, Christian & Rode, Martin, 2016. "And Yet It Grows: Crisis, Ideology, and Interventionist Policy Ratchets," Working Paper Series 1135, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    3. Diana W. Thomas, 2020. "Michael C. Munger: Tomorrow 3.0: transaction costs and the sharing economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 229-232, January.
    4. Diana W. Thomas & Peter T. Leeson, 2012. "The brewer, the baker, and the monopoly maker," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 1(1), pages 84-95, April.
    5. J. Brandon Bolen & Claudia R. Williamson, 2019. "The Path of Reform: The Consequences of Institutional Volatility," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(3), pages 400-425, August.
    6. Diana Weinert Thomas & Michael Thomas, 2010. "Encouraging a Productive Research Agenda: Peter Boettke and the Devil's Test," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 26(Fall 2010), pages 103-115.
    7. Adam Martin, 2010. "The Analects of Boettke," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 26(Fall 2010), pages 125-141.
    8. Christopher Coyne & Russell Sobel & John Dove, 2010. "The non-productive entrepreneurial process," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 23(4), pages 333-346, December.
    9. Diana W. Thomas & Michael D. Thomas, 2022. "Regulation, competition, and the social control of business," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 193(1), pages 109-125, October.
    10. repec:elg:eechap:15325_11 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Diana W. Thomas & Peter T. Leeson, 2012. "Purpose – This paper seeks to examine how productive entrepreneurial activities, such as innovation, influence unproductive entrepreneurial activities, such as regulatory rent seeking. Design/methodol," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 1(4), pages 84-95, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Transitional gains trap; Rent seeking; Economic history; Regulation; Europe; N43; H89; L51;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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