IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v136y2008i3p397-409.html

Bequests, sibling rivalry, and rent seeking

Author

Listed:
  • Roger Faith
  • Brian Goff

  • Robert Tollison

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger Faith & Brian Goff & Robert Tollison, 2008. "Bequests, sibling rivalry, and rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 397-409, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:3:p:397-409
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9302-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-008-9302-1
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-008-9302-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alston, Lee J. & Schapiro, Morton Owen, 1984. "Inheritance Laws Across Colonies: Causes and Consequences," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 277-287, June.
    2. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    3. Stark, Oded, 1998. "Equal bequests and parental altruism: compatibility or orthogonality?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 167-171, August.
    4. James M. Buchanan, 1983. "Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 443-457, Springer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kyung Hwan Baik & Youngseok Park, 2022. "Contests for catch shares," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 23-42, March.
    2. Yuk Ying Chang & Martin Young, 2015. "Dissipative Competition: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 169-198, June.
    3. Mizuki Komura & Hikaru Ogawa, 2017. "The prodigal son: does the younger brother always care for his parentsin old age?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(22), pages 2153-2165, May.
    4. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2015. "Endogenous division rules as a family constitution: strategic altruistic transfers and sibling competition," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 173-194, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yang-Ming Chang, 2012. "Strategic transfers, redistributive fiscal policies, and family bonds: a micro-economic analysis," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 1481-1502, October.
    2. Yang-Ming Chang, 2007. "Transfers and bequests: a portfolio analysis in a Nash game," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 277-295, March.
    3. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2015. "Endogenous division rules as a family constitution: strategic altruistic transfers and sibling competition," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 173-194, January.
    4. Roger L. Faith, 2002. "Rent Seeking and Fixed-Share Pools in Government," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(5), pages 442-455, September.
    5. Alice Guerra & Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2019. "Productive and unproductive competition: a unified framework," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(3), pages 785-804, October.
    6. Leonard Daniel & Long Ngo Van, 2012. "IS EMULATION GOOD FOR YOU? THE UPsAND DOWNsOF RIVALRY," Global Journal of Economics (GJE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(01), pages 1-21.
    7. Mantell, Edmund H., 1996. "The social costs of monopoly and regulation: Posner reconsidered again," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 249-268.
    8. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018. "Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
    9. Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Valimaki, Juuso, 2017. "All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Values," MPRA Paper 80799, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Gil S Epstein, 2012. "Employer’s information and promotion-seeking activities," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 1(4), pages 21-32.
    11. Shinichi Nishiyama, 2000. "Bequests, Inter Vivos Transfers, and Wealth Distribution: Technical Paper 2000-8," Working Papers 13332, Congressional Budget Office.
    12. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties," Departmental Working Papers 200629, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    13. Dhritiman Gupta, 2020. "Prize sharing rules in collective contests: When does group size matter?," Discussion Papers 20-04, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    14. Kyung Hwan Baik, 2007. "Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(4), pages 986-1002, April.
    15. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2015. "Do polls create momentum in political competition?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 1-14.
    16. Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi, 2016. "Optimal Prizes," Department of Economics Working Papers 16-03, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    17. Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013. "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
    18. Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2017. "Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(4), pages 1167-1200, October.
    19. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
    20. Marco A. Haan & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2003. "Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 215-235, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:3:p:397-409. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.