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Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession

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  • Buchanan, James M

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  • Buchanan, James M, 1983. "Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 71-85, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:26:y:1983:i:1:p:71-85
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467026
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
    2. Louis Kaplow, 2000. "A Framework for Assessing Estate and Gift Taxation," NBER Working Papers 7775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. repec:elg:eechap:15325_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Dong Xiang & Andrew C. Worthington & Helen Higgs, 2014. "Family ownership, altruism and agency costs in Australian small- and medium-sized enterprises," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(32), pages 3907-3921, November.
    5. Yang-Ming Chang, 2012. "Strategic transfers, redistributive fiscal policies, and family bonds: a micro-economic analysis," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 1481-1502, October.
    6. Markantonatou, Maria, 2013. "Diagnosis, treatment, and effects of the crisis in Greece: A 'special case' or a 'test case'?," MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    7. Lueck, Dean & Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Property Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
      • Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Property Law," Working papers 2004-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    8. Baker, Matthew & Miceli, Thomas J., 2005. "Land inheritance rules: theory and cross-cultural analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 77-102, January.
    9. Joseph Jadlow, 1985. "Monopoly rent seeking under conditions of uncertainty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 73-87, January.
    10. repec:spr:jopoec:v:30:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00148-017-0635-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Matthew J. Baker, 2004. "Human Capital and Hold-ups in Indigenous Society: The Role of Customs and the Market," Departmental Working Papers 7, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
    12. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2015. "Endogenous division rules as a family constitution: strategic altruistic transfers and sibling competition," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 173-194, January.
    13. Louis Kaplow, 1999. "Transfer Motives and Tax Policy," NBER Working Papers 6340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Justina Klimaviciute & Sergio Perelman & Pierre Pestieau & Jerome Schoenmaeckers, 2017. "Caring for dependent parents: Altruism, exchange or family norm?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(3), pages 835-873, July.
    15. Schulze, William S. & Lubatkin, Michael H. & Dino, Richard N., 2003. "Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 473-490, July.
    16. Roger Faith & Brian Goff & Robert Tollison, 2008. "Bequests, sibling rivalry, and rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 397-409, September.

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