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An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1998. "The Tobacco Deal," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1998 Micr), pages 323-394.
  2. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2020. "On the Benefits of Set-Asides," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1655-1696.
  4. Courty, Pascal, 2011. "Unpriced quality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 13-15, April.
  5. Boone, Jan, 2002. "'Be Nice, Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3342, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Boone, J., 2003. "Optimal Competition : A Benchmark for Competition Policy," Discussion Paper 2003-3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Matthew Selove, 2019. "Dynamic pricing with fairness concerns and a capacity constraint," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 385-413, December.
  8. Boone, J., 2002. "'Be Nice Unless it Pays to Fight' : A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," Other publications TiSEM 739723a0-ffec-49c9-bef8-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  9. Peck, James, 1996. "Competition in Transactions Mechanisms: The Emergence of Price Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 109-123, September.
  10. Simon Stevenson & James Young, 2015. "The Role of Undisclosed Reserves in English Open Outcry Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 375-402, June.
  11. Sarah Parlane, 2003. "Auction versus private treaty," Working Papers 200306, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
  12. Boone, J., 2003. "'Be nice, unless it pays to fight' : A new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy," Other publications TiSEM 7066cb71-3c22-4565-8c71-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  13. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2021. "Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 310-328.
  14. Hao Li, 2001. "A Theory of Conservatism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 617-636, June.
  15. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock, 2011. "Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 29-74, May.
  16. Michael J. Dueker, 2000. "Are prime rate changes asymmetric?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 82(Sep), pages 33-40.
  17. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
  18. Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 74-96, March.
  19. Boone, J., 2003. "Optimal Competition : A Benchmark for Competition Policy," Other publications TiSEM 6e493d6c-b9ca-4ed2-911a-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  20. Antonio Rosato, 2016. "Selling substitute goods to loss-averse consumers: limited availability, bargains, and rip-offs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(3), pages 709-733, August.
  21. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
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