A monopolist charges the same price for differentiated products when high quality products are likely to be assigned to low valuation consumers. The argument explains the use of 'unpriced quality' for concert tickets, movie theaters, and elsewhere.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Connolly, Marie & Krueger, Alan B., 2006.
"Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music,"
Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture,
- Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, 2005. "Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music," NBER Working Papers 11282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Miravete, Eugenio, 2007. "The Limited Gains From Complex Tariffs," Working Paper Series 3971, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- Orbach, Barak Y. & Einav, Liran, 2007. "Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case of the movie-theater industry," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 129-153.
- Richard J. Gilbert & Paul Klemperer, 2000. "An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
- Gilbert, Richard & Klemperer, Paul, 1993. "An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing," CEPR Discussion Papers 805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Richard J. Gilbert & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing," Microeconomics 9907005, EconWPA.
- Holt, Charles A, Jr & Sherman, Roger, 1982. "Waiting-Line Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 280-294, April.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
- Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
- Sofronis K. Clerides, 2004. "Price Discrimination with Differentiated Products: Definition and Identification," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 402-412, July.
- Phillip Leslie & Alan Sorensen, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Ticket Resale," NBER Working Papers 15476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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