IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eui/euiwps/eco2009-16.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Unpriced Quality

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Courty

Abstract

A monopolist deliberately charges the same price for differentiated products when high quality products are more likely to be allocated to low type consumers under uniform pricing. The argument can explain the use of ‘unpriced quality’ for concert tickets, sport events, and in many other situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Courty, 2009. "Unpriced Quality," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/16, European University Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2009/16
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/10929/1/ECO_2009_16.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Orbach, Barak Y. & Einav, Liran, 2007. "Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case of the movie-theater industry," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 129-153.
    2. Richard J. Gilbert & Paul Klemperer, 2000. "An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 1-21.
    3. Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    5. Sofronis K. Clerides, 2004. "Price Discrimination with Differentiated Products: Definition and Identification," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 402-412, July.
    6. Connolly, Marie & Krueger, Alan B., 2006. "Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music," Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, Elsevier.
    7. Miravete, Eugenio, 2007. "The Limited Gains From Complex Tariffs," Working Paper Series 3971, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    8. Richard J. Gilbert & Paul Klemperer, 2000. "An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 1-21.
    9. Holt, Charles A, Jr & Sherman, Roger, 1982. "Waiting-Line Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 280-294, April.
    10. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
    11. Phillip Leslie & Alan Sorensen, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Ticket Resale," NBER Working Papers 15476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Price discrimination; second degree price discrimination; queuing; rationing;

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2009/16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julia Valerio). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deiueit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.