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Opt in versus opt out: A free-entry analysis of privacy policies

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  • BOUCKAERT, Jan
  • DEGRYSE, Hans

Abstract

There is much debate on how the flow of information between firms should be organized, and whether existing privacy laws should be amended. We offer a welfare comparison of the three main current policies towards consumer privacy .anonymity, opt in, and opt out .within a two-period model of localized competition. We show that when consumers find it too costly to opt in or opt out .such that the default is the policy that rules, privacy policies shape firms’ ability to collect and use customer information, and affect their pricing strategy and entry decision differently. The free-entry analysis reveals that social welfare is non-monotonic in the degree of privacy protection. Opt out is the socially preferred privacy policy while opt in socially underperforms anonymity. Consumers never opt out and choose to opt in only when its cost is sufficiently low. Only when opting in is cost-free do the opt-in and opt-out privacy policies coincide.

Suggested Citation

  • BOUCKAERT, Jan & DEGRYSE, Hans, 2007. "Opt in versus opt out: A free-entry analysis of privacy policies," Working Papers 2007025, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2007025
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    1. repec:kap:ejlwec:v:44:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-014-9436-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Wahyoe Soedarmono & Romora Edward Sitorus & Amine Tarazi, 2015. "Bank charter value, systemic risk and credit reporting systems: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific region," Working Papers hal-01174111, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privacy; Price discrimination; Monopolistic competition; Welfare;

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory

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