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Price discrimination and the modes of failure in deregulated retail electricity markets

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  • Paul Simshauser

    (Griffith Business School, Griffith University Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge)

Abstract

In Australia, as with Great Britain, governments have shown rising concern with the health of competitive residential electricity markets. A core concern is the practice of price discrimination and the rising dispersion of prices. The State of Queensland implemented Full Retail Contestability in 2007, but held a regulated price cap in place until 2016, when it finally deregulated its residential electricity market. Almost simultaneously, the two jurisdictions that pioneered retail price deregulation, Great Britain and Victoria, were questioning their prior policy decision. Queensland makes for a fascinating case study because Southeast Queensland comprises a fully deregulated retail market while Regional Queensland is a regulated monopoly – with common input costs across both zones. Consequently, a regulated monopoly with a uniform tariff and 640,000 customers forms a very large control group, which can be directly compared to the competitive market of more than 1.3 million customers – making such analysis globally unique. Analysis of Queensland market conditions concludes the policy is welfare enhancing. To be clear, rising electricity prices are a problem, but price discrimination is not. The deregulated competitive market is, perhaps unsurprisingly, better at regulating the overall average tariff and consumer welfare has been enhanced by $184 million per annum – with some consumer segments very materially better off. However, certain modes of failure remain, viz. an inter-consumer misallocation problem and lack of transparency vis-à-vis the anchoring of discounts – known as the “discounts off what?” problem. Resolving the inter-consumer misallocation problem is relatively straight forward via ensuring energy retailers (voluntarily) move vulnerable customers onto a Benchmark-equivalent or suitably discounted tariff. Due to the non-linearity of tariffs and the rising mix of discrete metered loads, the latter can be best solved by producing a weighted average of Sta
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Suggested Citation

  • Paul Simshauser, 2018. "Price discrimination and the modes of failure in deregulated retail electricity markets," Working Papers EPRG 1827, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1827
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    Cited by:

    1. Tsao, Yu-Chung & Vu, Thuy-Linh, 2019. "Power supply chain network design problem for smart grid considering differential pricing and buy-back policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 493-502.
    2. Paul Simshauser, 2022. "The 2022 energy crisis: horizontal and vertical impacts of policy interventions in Australia's national electricity market," Working Papers EPRG2216, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    3. Correa-Giraldo, Manuel & Garcia-Rendon, John J. & Perez, Alex, 2021. "Strategic behaviors and transfer of wholesale costs to retail prices in the electricity market: Evidence from Colombia," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    4. Guo, Xiaodan & Xiao, Bowen, 2022. "How can pricing strategy for district heating help China realize cleaner residential heating?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    5. Dormady, Noah & Roa-Henriquez, Alfredo & Hoyt, Matthew & Pesavento, Matthew & Koenig, Grace & Welch, William & Li, Zejun, 2025. "How are retail prices formed in restructured electricity markets?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    6. Tsao, Yu-Chung & Beyene, Tsehaye Dedimas & Thanh, Vo-Van & Gebeyehu, Sisay Geremew & Kuo, Tsai-Chi, 2022. "Power distribution network design considering the distributed generations and differential and dynamic pricing," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
    7. Billimoria, Farhad & Mays, Jacob & Poudineh, Rahmat, 2025. "Hedging and tail risk in electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    8. Esplin, Ryan & Davis, Ben & Rai, Alan & Nelson, Tim, 2020. "The impacts of price regulation on price dispersion in Australia's retail electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    9. Paul Simshauser, 2021. "Lessons from Australia's National Electricity Market 1998-2018: strengths and weaknesses of the reform experience," Chapters, in: Jean-Michel Glachant & Paul L. Joskow & Michael G. Pollitt (ed.), Handbook on Electricity Markets, chapter 9, pages 242-286, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Simshauser, Paul, 2023. "The 2022 energy crisis: Fuel poverty and the impact of policy interventions in Australia's National Electricity Market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    11. Simshauser, Paul & Akimov, Alexandr, 2019. "Regulated electricity networks, investment mistakes in retrospect and stranded assets under uncertainty," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 117-133.
    12. Stephen Littlechild, 2019. "Promoting competition and protecting customers? Regulation of the GB retail energy market 2008–2016," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 107-139, April.
    13. Simshauser, Paul, 2021. "Vulnerable households and fuel poverty: Measuring the efficiency of policy targeting in Queensland," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    14. Simeone, Christina E. & Lange, Ian & Gilbert, Ben, 2023. "Pass-through in residential retail electricity competition: Evidence from Pennsylvania," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    15. Tengjiao Chen & Daniel H. Karney, 2025. "Environmental Policy in General Equilibrium under Market Power and Price Discrimination," Papers 2501.03114, arXiv.org.
    16. Khalilpour, Kaveh R. & Lusis, Peter, 2020. "Network capacity charge for sustainability and energy equity: A model-based analysis," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 266(C).
    17. Muyi Yang & Yuanying Chi & Kristy Mamaril & Adam Berry & Xunpeng Shi & Liming Zhu, 2020. "Communication-Based Approach for Promoting Energy Consumer Switching: Some Evidence from Ofgem’s Database Trials in the United Kingdom," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(19), pages 1-16, October.
    18. Bowen, William M. & Hill, Edward (Ned) & Thomas, Andrew & Liu, Ruoran & Henning, Mark, 2023. "Consumer price effects of deregulated electric generation markets: The case of Ohio and the midwestern United States," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    19. Stephen Littlechild, 2021. "The challenge of removing a mistaken price cap," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 391-415, October.
    20. Dang‐Long Bui, 2025. "Can Firms Favor Location Regulation?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 46(3), pages 1749-1762, April.
    21. Khezr, Peyman & Nepal, Rabindra, 2021. "On the viability of energy-capacity markets under decreasing marginal costs," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    22. Paul Simshauser, 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Working Papers EPRG2008, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    23. Thomasi, Virginia & Siluk, Julio Cezar M. & Rigo, Paula D. & Pappis, Cesar Augusto de O., 2024. "Challenges, improvements, and opportunities market with the liberalization of the residential electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy

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