Author
Listed:
- Westberg, Nina Bruvik
- Skjeflo, Sofie Waage
- Kallbekken, Steffen
Abstract
The recent surge in European energy prices led to widespread government compensation, mainly through untargeted price subsidies that disproportionately benefited high-consumption and, on average, high-income households. While lump sum transfers would maintain energy-saving incentives and could be perceived as fairer, public awareness of the schemes’ properties remains limited. Using a nationally representative survey experiment in Norway (n = 1936), we assess how information about the distribution of compensation and electricity-saving incentives affects public support for price subsidies and lump sum transfers. Initial support for price subsidies is very high. Informing about the distribution of compensation reduces support for subsidies and increases support for lump sum transfers. Our findings suggest that correcting misperceptions about the distribution of compensation drives these shifts. In contrast, information about incentives has no overall effect, likely because it has a weaker impact on households with high electricity expenditures who benefit the most from a price subsidy. These findings highlight the importance of transparent communication in shaping public opinion on energy policies and emphasize the importance of distributional concerns. Although providing information shifts support in favor of the lump sum, the price subsidy remains the preferred scheme, underscoring the challenge of transitioning to compensation models that maintain energy-savings incentives.
Suggested Citation
Westberg, Nina Bruvik & Skjeflo, Sofie Waage & Kallbekken, Steffen, 2025.
"The power of information: A survey experiment on public support for electricity price compensation schemes,"
Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
Handle:
RePEc:eee:enepol:v:206:y:2025:i:c:s0301421525002447
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2025.114737
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