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Citations for "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information"

by Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M

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  1. Jenny Simon, 2014. "The Role of Imperfect Financial Markets for Social Redistribution," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(4), pages 32-37, 01.
  2. Edward S. Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2000. "Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information," Working Paper 00-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  3. Beth Allen, 1996. "Implementation theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 226, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  4. Russell Cooper, 1983. "Worker Asymmetric Information and Involuntary Unemployment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 671R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 1984.
  5. Ronen, Joshua & Yaari, Varda, 1996. "Characterization of a class of moral-hazard, adverse selection games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 355-358, March.
  6. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
  8. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," CESifo Working Paper Series 581, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Giuseppe, DE FEO & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2005. "Efficiency of Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  10. Riordan, Michael H & Staiger, Robert W, 1993. "Sectoral Shocks and Structural Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 611-29, August.
  11. Choe, Chongwoo, 1998. "Contract design and costly verification games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 327-340, February.
  12. Ray Rees & Patricia Apps, 2006. "Genetic testing, income distribution and insurance markets, CHERE Working Paper 2006/3," Working Papers 2006/3, CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney.
  13. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 12224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Prescott, Edward Simpson & Townsend, Robert M., 2002. "Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 282-310, April.
  15. Adriano Rampini & Alberto Bisin, 2005. "Markets as Beneficial Constraints on the Government," 2005 Meeting Papers 325, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  16. Doepke, Matthias & Townsend, Robert M., 2006. "Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 235-285, January.
  17. Edward P. Lazear, 1986. "Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 1917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  19. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
  20. Maskin, Eric S. & Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1983. "Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks," Scholarly Articles 3448840, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  21. Nolan Miller & Alexander F. Wagner & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2012. "Solomonic Separation: Risk Decisions as Productivity Indicators," NBER Working Papers 18634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Schenk-Mathes, Heike Y., 1995. "The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 176-187, October.
  23. V.V. Chari, 1984. "Layoffs and Unemployment Compensation as Social Instruments," Discussion Papers 617, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  24. Bradford, Richard M., 1996. "Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 226-236, March.
  25. Saglam, Ismail, 2014. "Research and Development of an Optimally Regulated Monopolist with Unknown Costs," MPRA Paper 60245, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Guillen, Montserrat & Manuel Artis, 1994. "Count Data Models For A Credit Scoring System," Working Papers 021, Risk and Insurance Archive.
  27. Peter Bogetoft, 2000. "DEA and Activity Planning under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 7-48, January.
  28. Belli, Paolo, 2001. "How adverse selection affects the health insurance market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2574, The World Bank.
  29. Russell Cooper, 1983. "On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 647R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  30. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Interpreting Real World Contracts: An Investigation of Ex Post Mutually Beneficial Agreements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 290, UCLA Department of Economics.
  31. Luis Corchon & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin, 1994. "Robust implementation under alternative information structures," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 159-171, December.
  32. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2008. "Should bank supervisors disclose information about their banks?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 1-16.
  33. Chang, Chun, 1999. "Capital structure as optimal contracts," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 363-385.
  34. Jérôme Ballet & Philippe Meral & Dawidson Razafimahatolotra, 2009. "Altruism, Paternalism and Transfers," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2009(3), pages 267-282.
  35. Kevin Currier, 2004. "Natural monopoly regulation in the presence of cost misreporting," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(1), pages 49-61, March.
  36. Chari, V V, 1983. "Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 107-22, Supplemen.
  37. Borys Grochulski, 2008. "Limits to redistribution and intertemporal wedges : implications of Pareto optimality with private information," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 173-196.
  38. Acemoglu, Daron & Golosov, Mikhail & Tsyvinski, Aleh, 2008. "Markets versus governments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 159-189, January.
  39. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Anne C. Sibert, 1984. "The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information," International Finance Discussion Papers 248, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  40. Jenny Simon, 2011. "Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government," 2011 Meeting Papers 447, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  41. Prescott, Edward & Shell, Karl, 2002. "Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries," Working Papers 02-08, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  42. Jain, Neelam, 2006. "Debt, managerial compensation and learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 377-399, February.
  43. Victor V. Claar, 1998. "An Incentive-Compatibility Approach To the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(6), pages 599-610, November.
  44. Edward P. Lazear, 1983. "Raids and Imitation," NBER Working Papers 1158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  45. Jenny Simon, 2014. "Imperfect Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government," CESifo Working Paper Series 4902, CESifo Group Munich.
  46. Chester Spatt, 1983. "The objectives of private and public judges," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 139-143, January.
  47. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 796, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  48. Li, Shu-Hsing & Balachandran, Kashi R., 1997. "Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 138-153, April.
  49. Courty, Pascal & Li, Hao, 2000. "Sequential Screening," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717, October.
  50. V.V. Chari, 1980. "Equilibrium Contracts in a Monetary Economy," Discussion Papers 460, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  51. Garud Iyengar & Anuj Kumar, 2008. "Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 129-154, June.
  52. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Bruce Greenwald, 1992. "Towards a Reformulation of Monetary Theory: Competitive Banking," NBER Working Papers 4117, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  53. Cheng, Hsing K. & Freimer, Marshall & Richmond, William B. & Sumita, Ushio, 1996. "Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 411-426, June.
  54. repec:dgr:kubcen:2013078 is not listed on IDEAS
  55. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott, 1985. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Staff Report 87, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  56. Russell Cooper, 1984. "Insurance, Flexibility and Non-contingent Trades," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 691, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  57. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  58. Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Consommation, partage de risque et assurance informelle : développements théoriques et tests empiriques récents," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 78(1), pages 115-149, Mars.
  59. Quillerou, Emmanuelle & Fraser, Rob W., 2009. "Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Does the Higher Level Entry Scheme Design Reduce Adverse Selection?," 83rd Annual Conference, March 30-April 1, 2009, Dublin, Ireland 51068, Agricultural Economics Society.
  60. Dye, Ronald A., 2001. "An evaluation of "essays on disclosure" and the disclosure literature in accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 181-235, December.
  61. Dragon, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1996. "A collective tournament," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 223-227, February.
  62. Carmen Arguedas & Daan Soest, 2011. "Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(2), pages 305-323, October.
  63. Claude d'Aspremont & Jacques Crémer & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 281-310, October.
  64. Wagner, Alexander F. & Miller, Nolan H. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2006. "Screening budgets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 351-374, November.
  65. Persons, John C., 1997. "Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 269-306, October.
  66. Thomas A. Gresik & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1985. "The Rate At Which a Simple Market Becomes Efficient as the Number of Traders Increases: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 708, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  67. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
  68. Grundel, S. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2013. "Resource Allocation Problems with Concave Reward Functions," Discussion Paper 2013-070, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  69. Benveniste, Lawrence M. & Busaba, Walid Y. & Wilhelm Jr., William J., 1996. "Price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 223-255, October.
  70. Busaba, Walid Y. & Chang, Chun, 2010. "Bookbuilding vs. fixed price revisited: The effect of aftermarket trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 370-381, June.
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