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Worker Asymmetric Information and Involuntary Unemployment

  • Russell Cooper
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    File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d06b/d0671-r.pdf
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    Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 671R.

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    Length: 35 pages
    Date of creation: 1983
    Date of revision: Apr 1984
    Publication status: Published in Journal of Labor Economics (1985), 3(2): 188-208
    Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:671r
    Note: CFP 614.
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
    Phone: (203) 432-3702
    Fax: (203) 432-6167
    Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/

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    Order Information: Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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    1. John G. Riley, 1976. "Informational Equilibrium," UCLA Economics Working Papers 071, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Hall, Robert E & Lilien, David M, 1979. "Efficient Wage Bargains under Uncertain Supply and Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 868-79, December.
    3. Jerry R. Green & Seppo Honkapohja, 1981. "Bilateral Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0721, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
    5. Kahn, Charles M, 1985. "Optimal Severance Pay with Incomplete Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 435-51, June.
    6. Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    7. Masanori Hashimoto & Ben T. Yu, 1980. "Specific Capital, Employmemt Contracts, and Wage Rigidity," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 536-549, Autumn.
    8. Moore, John, 1985. "Optimal Labour Contracts When Workers Have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 37-67, January.
    9. Lorne Carmichael, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Working Papers 452, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    10. Chari, V V, 1983. "Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 107-22, Supplemen.
    11. Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-57, April.
    12. Azariadis, Costas, 1983. "Employment with Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 157-72, Supplemen.
    13. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
    14. Azariadis, Costas & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983. "Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 1-22, Supplemen.
    15. Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35, January.
    16. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 123-56, Supplemen.
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