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Wage structure when wage offers are private

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  • Lam, Kit-Chun
  • Liu, Pak-Wai
  • Wong, Yue-Chim

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  • Lam, Kit-Chun & Liu, Pak-Wai & Wong, Yue-Chim, 1995. "Wage structure when wage offers are private," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 19-32, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:2:y:1995:i:1:p:19-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990. "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
    2. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1986. "Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 355-375, July.
    3. Arnott, Richard J & Hosios, Arthur J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Implicit Contracts, Labor Mobility, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1046-1066, December.
    4. Berkovitch, Elazar, 1986. "Implicit Labor Contracts to Explain Turnover," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 341-354, July.
    5. Weiss, Yoram, 1984. "Wage Contracts When Output Grows Stochastically: The Roles of Mobility Costs and Capital Market Imperfections," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 155-173, April.
    6. Lorne Carmichael, 1983. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring.
    7. John Moore, 1985. "Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(1), pages 37-67.
    8. Ito, Takatoshi, 1988. "Labor Contracts with Voluntary Quits," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(1), pages 100-131, January.
    9. Bernhardt, Dan & Timmis, Gerald C, 1990. "Multiperiod Wage Contracts and Productivity Profiles," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(4), pages 529-563, October.
    10. Richard Arnott, 1982. "The Structure of Multi-Period Employment Contracts with Incomplete Insurance Markets," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(1), pages 51-76, February.
    11. Smith Freeman, 1977. "Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential: A Model and Application to Academic Early Retirement," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 419-443, Autumn.
    12. Kahn, Charles M, 1985. "Optimal Severance Pay with Incomplete Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 435-451, June.
    13. Arnott, Richard J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Labor Turnover, Wage Structures, and Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(4), pages 434-462, October.
    14. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
    15. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-480, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lam, Kit-Chun & Liu, Pak-Wai, 2000. "Verifiable wage offers and recontracting: effect on wage and consumption profiles," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 449-462, July.

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