IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegation


  • Schenk-Mathes, Heike Y.


No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Schenk-Mathes, Heike Y., 1995. "The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 176-187, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:86:y:1995:i:1:p:176-187

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Sappington, David, 1984. "Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 52-70, October.
    2. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-578, June.
    3. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
    4. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Frank Y. & Krass, Dmitry, 2001. "Analysis of supply contracts with minimum total order quantity commitments and non-stationary demands," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 131(2), pages 309-323, June.
    2. Vetschera, Rudolf, 2000. "A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 152-165, October.
    3. Albrecht, Martin & Stadtler, Hartmut, 2015. "Coordinating decentralized linear programs by exchange of primal information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 247(3), pages 788-796.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:86:y:1995:i:1:p:176-187. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.