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The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegation

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  • Schenk-Mathes, Heike Y.

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  • Schenk-Mathes, Heike Y., 1995. "The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 176-187, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:86:y:1995:i:1:p:176-187
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-578, June.
    2. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
    3. Sappington, David, 1984. "Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 52-70, October.
    4. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Frank Y. & Krass, Dmitry, 2001. "Analysis of supply contracts with minimum total order quantity commitments and non-stationary demands," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 131(2), pages 309-323, June.
    2. Vetschera, Rudolf, 2000. "A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 152-165, October.
    3. Albrecht, Martin & Stadtler, Hartmut, 2015. "Coordinating decentralized linear programs by exchange of primal information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 247(3), pages 788-796.
    4. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2022. "Wasteful procedures?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    5. Osman Alp & Alper Şen, 2021. "Delegation of Stocking Decisions Under Asymmetric Demand Information," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(1), pages 55-69, 1-2.

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