Bookbuilding vs. fixed price revisited: The effect of aftermarket trading
Investors who possess information about the value of an IPO can participate in the offering as well as trade strategically in the aftermarket. Both the bookbuilding and the fixed price IPO selling methods require more underpricing when aftermarket trading by informed investors is considered. Bookbuilding becomes especially costly, since the potential for profit in the aftermarket adversely affects investors' bidding behavior in the premarket. Unless the underwriter can restrict its bookbuilding effort to a small enough subset of the informed investors, a fixed price strategy that allocates the issue to retail investors produces higher proceeds on average, contrary to the conventional wisdom in the literature. We therefore find a benefit to limiting access to the premarket and, hence, provide an efficiency rationale for the practice by American bankers of marketing IPOs to a select group of investors. We also provide unique policy and empirical implications.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dai, Na, 2007. "Does investor identity matter? An empirical examination of investments by venture capital funds and hedge funds in PIPEs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 538-563, September.
- Benveniste, Lawrence M. & Busaba, Walid Y., 1997. "Bookbuilding vs. Fixed Price: An Analysis of Competing Strategies for Marketing IPOs," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(04), pages 383-403, December.
- Busaba, Walid Y., 2006. "Bookbuilding, the option to withdraw, and the timing of IPOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 159-186, January.
- Alexander P. Ljungqvist & Tim Jenkinson & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., 2003.
"Global Integration in Primary Equity Markets: The Role of U.S. Banks and U.S. Investors,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(1), pages 63-99.
- Alexander Ljungqvist & Tim Jenkinson & William Wilhelm, 2001. "Global Integration in Primary Equity Markets: The Role of U.S. Banks and U.S. Investors," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe06, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
- Tim Jenkinson & William Wilhelm, 2001. "Global Integration in Primary Equity Markets: The Role of U.S. Banks and U.S. Investors," Economics Series Working Papers 2001-FE-06, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Ann E. Sherman & Sheridan Titman, 2000.
"Building the IPO Order Book: Underpricing and Participation Limits With Costly Information,"
NBER Working Papers
7786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sherman, Ann E. & Titman, Sheridan, 2002. "Building the IPO order book: underpricing and participation limits with costly information," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 3-29, July.
- Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
- Welch, Ivo, 1992. " Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 695-732, June.
- Benveniste, Lawrence M. & Spindt, Paul A., 1989. "How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of new issues," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 343-361.
- Benveniste, Lawrence M. & Busaba, Walid Y. & Wilhelm Jr., William J., 1996. "Price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 223-255, October.
- Spatt, Chester & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Preplay Communication, Participation Restrictions, and Efficiency in Initial Public Offerings," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(4), pages 709-26.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1977.
"Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem,"
284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
- Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano, 2006.
"IPO Underpricing and After-Market Liquidity,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(2), pages 381-421.
- Rock, Kevin, 1986. "Why new issues are underpriced," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 187-212.
- Chen, Hsuan-Chi & Dai, Na & Schatzberg, John D., 2010. "The choice of equity selling mechanisms: PIPEs versus SEOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 104-119, February.
- Bradley, Daniel J. & Gonas, John S. & Highfield, Michael J. & Roskelley, Kenneth D., 2009. "An examination of IPO secondary market returns," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 316-330, June.
- Stoughton, Neal M. & Zechner, Josef, 1998. "IPO-mechanisms, monitoring and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 45-77, July.
- Neil Brisley & Walid Y. Busaba, 2007. "Secret Reservation Prices in Bookbuilding," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 11(4), pages 693-718.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:16:y:2010:i:3:p:370-381. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.