Altruism, Paternalism and Transfers
Discussions regarding the form that state transfers should take generally focus on the relative efficiency of transfers in kind vis-á-vis transfers in cash. This article, however, proposes a different approach - to determine the optimal structure of a donation, i.e. its optimal composition. Hence, the problem no longer lies in attempting to figure out whether a donation in kind is either more or less efficient than a donation in cash, but rather, to determine, through various hypotheses relative to the agent's behaviour, the most preferable structure for the donor.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 2009 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: nam. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3|
Phone: (02) 24 09 51 11
Fax: (02) 24 22 06 57
Web page: http://www.vse.cz/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Editorial office Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3, Czech Republic|
Web: http://www.vse.cz/pep/ Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
- Browning, Edgar K, 1981. "A Theory of Paternalistic In-Kind Transfers," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 579-97, October.
- Thurow, Lester C, 1974. "Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(2), pages 190-95, May.
- Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-83, May.
- Olsen, Edgar O, 1971. "Subsidized Housing in a Competitive Market: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 220-24, March.
- Toumanoff, Peter, 1986. "Exclusion Costs and the In-Kind Transfer," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3), pages 443-47.
- P. A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1977.
"A Model of Social Insurance With Variable Retirement,"
210, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December.
- Olsen, Edgar O, 1969. "A Competitive Theory of the Housing Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 612-22, Part I Se.
- Daly, George & Giertz, Fred J, 1972. "Welfare Economics and Welfare Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(1), pages 131-38, March.
- Olsen, Edgar O, 1971. "Some Theorems in the Theory of Efficient Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(1), pages 166-76, Jan.-Feb..
- Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991.
"Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-51, December.
- Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1988. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic," UCLA Economics Working Papers 532, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lester C. Thurow, 1971. "The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 327-336.
- Dye, Ronald A. & Antle, Rick, 1986. "Cost-minimizing welfare programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 259-265, July.
- Daly, George & Giertz, J. Fred, 1976. "Transfers and Pareto optimality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1-2), pages 179-182.
- Irwin Garfinkel, 1973. "Is In-Kind Redistribution Efficient," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 320-330.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2009:y:2009:i:3:id:354:p:267-282. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frantisek Sokolovsky)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.