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Altruism, Paternalism and Transfers

Author

Listed:
  • Jérôme Ballet
  • Philippe Meral
  • Dawidson Razafimahatolotra

Abstract

Discussions regarding the form that state transfers should take generally focus on the relative efficiency of transfers in kind vis-à-vis transfers in cash. This article, however, proposes a different approach - to determine the optimal structure of a donation, i.e. its optimal composition. Hence, the problem no longer lies in attempting to figure out whether a donation in kind is either more or less efficient than a donation in cash, but rather, to determine, through various hypotheses relative to the agent's behaviour, the most preferable structure for the donor.

Suggested Citation

  • Jérôme Ballet & Philippe Meral & Dawidson Razafimahatolotra, 2009. "Altruism, Paternalism and Transfers," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(3), pages 267-282.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2009:y:2009:i:3:id:354:p:267-282
    DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.354
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    altruism; transfer; paternalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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