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Maher Said

Personal Details

First Name:Maher
Middle Name:
Last Name:Said
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psa458
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/faculty/bio/maher-said
Terminal Degree:2009 Economics Department; Yale University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Economics Department
Stern School of Business
New York University (NYU)

New York City, New York (United States)
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/

: (212) 998-0860
(212) 995-4218
44 West Fourth Street, 7-180, New York, NY 10012
RePEc:edi:ednyuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Rahul Deb & Mallesh Pai & Maher Said, 2017. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," Working Papers tecipa-578, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  2. Rahul Deb & Maher Said, 2013. "Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-485, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  3. Ralph Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2011. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Working Papers 2011-5, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  4. Monte, Daniel & Said, Maher, 2010. "Learning in hidden Markov models with bounded memory," MPRA Paper 23854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2010.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Said, Maher, 2008. "Dynamic Markets with Randomly Arriving Agents," MPRA Paper 9868, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015. "Dynamic screening with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
  2. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
  3. Raphael Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2013. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 1-34.
  4. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
  5. Said, Maher, 2011. "Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 236-243, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Rahul Deb & Maher Said, 2013. "Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-485, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin Edelman & Sonia Jaffe & Scott Duke Kominers, 2010. "To Groupon or Not to Groupon: The Profitability of Deep Discounts," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-063, Harvard Business School, revised Jan 2014.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    3. Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2017. "Contracting with endogenous entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 85-110.
    4. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2015. "Optimal auction design under non-commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 854-890.
    5. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2015. "Ex post information rents in sequential screening," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 257-273.
    6. Akan, Mustafa & Ata, Barış & Dana, James D., 2015. "Revenue management by sequential screening," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 728-774.
    7. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    8. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Sequential versus Static Screening: an Equivalence Result," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 24, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    9. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  2. Ralph Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2011. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Working Papers 2011-5, University of Miami, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 819-853.
    2. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2013. "Ex post information rents and disclosure in sequential screening," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 406, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    4. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2015. "Ex post information rents in sequential screening," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 257-273.
    5. Litterscheid, Sina & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "Sequential, multidimensional screening," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100621, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Terstiege, Stefan, 2013. "Precontractual Investigation and Sequential Screening," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 429, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    7. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2015. "Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 762-790.
    8. Sergiu Ungureanu, 2017. "Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 667-692, August.
    9. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    10. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    11. Andrzej Skrzypacz & Juuso Toikka, 2015. "Mechanisms for Repeated Trade," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 252-293, November.
    12. Terstiege, Stefan, 2016. "Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 70-87.
    13. Rahul Deb & Maher Said, 2013. "Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-485, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    14. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.

  3. Monte, Daniel & Said, Maher, 2010. "Learning in hidden Markov models with bounded memory," MPRA Paper 23854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2010.

    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2015. "Robust stochastic stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 31-57, January.
    2. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2015. "Reaching Consensus in Social Networks," IESE Research Papers D/1116, IESE Business School.

  4. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

    Cited by:

    1. Kiho Yoon, 2015. "On Budget Balance of the Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Discussion Paper Series 1501, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    2. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    3. Babaioff, Moshe & Blumrosen, Liad & Roth, Aaron, 2015. "Auctions with online supply," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 227-246.
    4. Liu, Heng, 0. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    5. Katehakis, Michael N. & Puranam, Kartikeya S., 2012. "On bidding for a fixed number of items in a sequence of auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 76-84.
    6. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017. "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.

  5. Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Said, Maher, 2011. "Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 236-243, September.
    4. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.

  6. Said, Maher, 2008. "Dynamic Markets with Randomly Arriving Agents," MPRA Paper 9868, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    3. Hummel, Patrick, 2015. "Simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 269-284.
    4. Mingrong Wang & Mingxi Wang & Lihua Lang, 2017. "Reconsidering Carbon Permits Auction Mechanism: An Efficient Dynamic Model," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(8), pages 1624-1645, August.
    5. Pownall, Rachel A.J. & Wolk, Leonard, 2013. "Bidding behavior and experience in internet auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 14-27.
    6. Vadovič, Radovan, 2017. "Bidding behavior and price search in Internet auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 125-147.
    7. Budde, Maximilian & Minner, Stefan, 2015. "Optimal capacity provision for service providers with subsequent auctioning of projects," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(PB), pages 652-662.
    8. Bryan Lim, 2010. "The Case for Last-Second Bidding," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000343, David K. Levine.
    9. Dennis Clerck & Erik Demeulemeester, 2016. "A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(2), pages 427-457, March.
    10. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  7. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    2. Hummel, Patrick, 2015. "Simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 269-284.
    3. Kenju Kamei, 2018. "Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms," Working Papers 2018_04, Durham University Business School.
    4. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Different Use Lengths," KIER Working Papers 924, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017. "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 252-270.
    8. Ryuji Sano, 2017. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Overbooking, Different Deadlines, and Multi-unit Demands," KIER Working Papers 963, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    9. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    10. Liu, Heng, 0. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    11. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    12. Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 45-76.
    13. Ron Lavi & Ella Segev, 2014. "Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 791-819, November.
    14. Hanzhe Zhang, 2013. "The Optimal Sequence of Costly Mechanisms," Working Papers 2014-005, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    15. Ely, Jeffrey & Garrett, Daniel F. & Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2016. "Overbooking," TSE Working Papers 16-678, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

Articles

  1. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015. "Dynamic screening with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Raphael Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2013. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 1-34.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Said, Maher, 2011. "Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 236-243, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 11 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (7) 2008-02-23 2008-08-14 2008-11-25 2010-03-28 2010-05-22 2011-09-16 2013-05-22. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2008-08-14 2008-11-25 2011-09-16 2013-05-22 2017-02-26. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2008-02-23 2008-08-14 2008-11-25 2010-05-22
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2008-02-23 2013-05-22
  5. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (2) 2010-07-24 2011-09-16
  6. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (1) 2008-08-14

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