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A Dynamic Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Different Use Lengths

Listed author(s):
  • Ryuji Sano

    ()

    (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University)

This paper considers a dynamic allocation problem in which many perishable goods are allocated at each period. Agents want to keep winning goods for more than one period to make profits. We consider efficient and optimal mechanisms when the seller offers simple long-term contracts. The dynamic VCG mechanism achieves efficient allocations. The expected revenue is maximized by the virtual welfare maximization. In the single unit case, price discounts for long-stay agents can be optimal under certain distributions. Both the efficient and optimal mechanisms are implemented by a simple “handicap auction” in the binary length case.

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File URL: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP924.pdf
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Paper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series KIER Working Papers with number 924.

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Length: 32pages
Date of creation: Jun 2015
Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:924
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Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501

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Web page: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/eng/index.html
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  1. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu, 2009. "Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 168-198, August.
  2. Thomas Kittsteiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 236-248, February.
  3. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
  4. Moldovanu, Benny & Dizdar, Deniz & Gershkov, Alex, 2011. "Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
  5. Alessandro Pavan & Ilya Segal & Juuso Toikka, 2014. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 601-653, March.
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